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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal is from the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The 
trial court held that Wolf Mountain could not amend its pleadings to add more parties to 
this action because the contract at issue mandates arbitration, but then held that Wolf 
Mountain could not compel arbitration because it had waived its right to arbitrate by 
engaging in litigation. 
However, this Court has held that arbitration is highly favored, there is a strong 
presumption against waiver of arbitration, the party proving waiver bears a heavy burden, 
and arbitration will not be deemed waived absent proof that a party intended to disregard 
its right to arbitrate, either explicitly or as inferred by (1) its participation in litigation and 
(2) any resulting prejudice to the opposing party. 
The trial court's waiver ruling should be reversed because none of these criteria 
have been met. First, Wolf Mountain understood and asserted to the trial court that the 
parties' arbitration agreement did not permit Wolf Mountain the right to seek arbitration. 
Summit County agreed with Wolf Mountain's assessment. By its express statements, 
Wolf Mountain did not waive - "intentionally relinquish a known right to" - arbitration. 
Second, Wolf Mountain's participation in litigation is insufficient to infer an intent 
to waive arbitration because the parties have engaged in primarily fact discovery and 
pretrial motions. "If participation in discovery and pretrial motions, standing alone, 
irrespective of the parties' intentions, were to constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, 
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the strong policy favoring arbitration would be damaged." Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. 
ParkwestAssocs., 2002 UT 3, \ 33, 40 P.3d 599. 
Third, ASCU is not prejudiced by the conduct of fact discovery to date in this case 
because it admits (and even demands) that such discovery pertains both to arbitrable and 
nonarbitrable claims. "[N]o prejudice results if the discovery relates to nonarbitrable 
claims which will be severed and separately litigated." Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 359 n.17 (Utah 1992). 
Finally, even if Wolf Mountain's actions did meet the applicable tests for waiver -
which they do not - waiver of arbitration under Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration 
Act violates the Utah Constitution. The jurisdiction of district courts is "limited by this 
constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5;see also id. art. V § 1; VI, § 1. 
Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration Act mandates: "The court, upon motion of any 
party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to 
arbitrate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999) (emphasis added). By its plain terms, 
arbitration "shall" be ordered, and ordering arbitration is "the essence o f the statutory 
scheme. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold otherwise. 
Ultimately, whether the SPA Agreement requires arbitration is not at issue on this 
appeal. The issue is whether Wolf Mountain waived arbitration under that Agreement. 
Under these circumstances, Wolf Mountain did not. Indeed, under careful constitutional 
scrutiny, Wolf Mountain may not. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
ruling that Wolf Mountain waived arbitration under Section 78-3 la-4 and remand this 
case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction arises under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-19 (1999) and 
78A-3-102 (2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue #1: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Wolf Mountain waived its 
statutory right to arbitrate the disputes in this action that arise under the parties' "SPA 
Agreement." This issue turns on three subsidiary issues: 
1. Whether Wolf Mountain's participation in the litigation prior to the trial 
court's determination that it must arbitrate with the Third Parties constituted a "knowing 
and intentional relinquishment" of its right to arbitration under the SPA Agreement; 
2. Whether Wolf Mountain "substantially participated in the underlying 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate" prior to filing its Motion to 
Compel Arbitration when the parties have engaged in primarily fact discovery and related 
pretrial motions; and 
3. Whether Wolf Mountain's "participation in the litigation . . . resulted in 
prejudice to" ASCU when the evidence of arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims is identical. 
Standard of Review. 
"[Wjhether a trial court correctly decided a motion to compel arbitration is 
a question of law which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial judge." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at % 10; see also Baker v. 
Stevens, 2005 UT 32, If 7, 114 P.3d 580. "[W]hether a contractual right of 
arbitration has been waived presents mixed questions of law and fact: whether the 
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trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which 
is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver 
are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which 
[appellate courts] give a district court deference." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, f 
20. However, where, as here, the trial court conducted no evidentiary hearing, and 
even permitted no oral argument regarding the Motion to Compel Arbitration (R. 
4007), any deference to the trial court's factual determinations is minimal. See, 
e.g., McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 1999 UT App 199, \ 10, 980 
P.2d 694 (holding that when "the trial court also based its denial of [the motion to 
compel arbitration] on affidavits and other documentary evidence without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing," the "decision was a legal conclusion and 
therefore, we review it for correctness, according no particular deference to the 
trial court's decision." (citations and quotations omitted))). 
Preservation. These issue were the subject of Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration (R. 3339-51), and of the decision below (R. 4028-34.). 
Issue #2: Whether the requirement of court-ordered arbitration pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 (1999) is mandatory and jurisdictional, including pursuant to Utah 
Const. Art. V, § 1, Art. VI § 1, and Art. VIII §§3 and 5, and thus cannot be abrogated by 
a party's waiver, in contraction to this Court's two-part test for waiver applied in 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992) and its progeny. 
Standard of Review. "c[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law 
that are reviewed for correctness.'" Esquivel v. Labor Cornrn'n of Utah, 2000 UT 66, f^ 
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13, 7 P.3d 777 (citations and quotations omitted). Likewise, "because interpreting the 
Utah Constitution presents a question of law, we review the trial court's determination for 
correctness and give no deference to its legal conclusions." Grand County v. Emery 
County, 2002 UT 57, \ 6, 52 P.3d 1148 (citations omitted). Finally, "[t]he determination 
of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness, according no deference to the district court's determination." Beaver v. 
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, f 8, 31 P.3d 1147, 1149 (citations omitted). 
Preservation. This issue was addressed in Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration (R. 3781-95, see esp. 3789-90). This issue was acknowledged by the trial 
court in its Ruling (R. 4023-24.), but the trial court did not address it. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution Art. 1, § 26: 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless 
by express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Utah Constitution Art V, § 1: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Constitution, Art. VI § 1: 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the 
Legislature of the State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
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Utah Constitution, Art VIII § 3: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court 
of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to 
issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause. 
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII § 5: 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and 
appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from 
the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over 
the cause. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1999): 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is 
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of 
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues 
and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration 
agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court 
having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall 
be made to that court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with 
proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action 
or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is 
made in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a 
stay of the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a 
claim that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds 
for the claim have not been shown. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Wolf Mountain leases real property located in Summit County to ASCU pursuant 
to a certain "Ground Lease." The Ground Lease includes property on which The 
Canyons Resort is located. In this case, each party alleges (among other claims) that the 
other breached the Ground Lease, which incorporates additional duties under a certain 
land development agreement called the "SPA Agreement." The SPA Agreement contains 
an arbitration clause. The parties dispute whether Wolf Mountain has waived - or even 
can waive - its statutory right to arbitration under the SPA Agreement. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
In 2006, Wolf Mountain served upon ASCU a Notice of Default under the Ground 
Lease and notified ASCU that it would terminate the Ground Lease if ASCU failed to 
cure the default. (R. 236-40.) In response, ASCU filed its Complaint in this case, 
followed by an Amended Complaint, claiming that Wolf Mountain had breached the 
Ground Lease, including its duties to assist in land development pursuant to the parties' 
SPA Agreement, which the Ground Lease incorporates. (R. 223-60.) Wolf Mountain 
counterclaimed, asserting ASCU's breaches of the Ground Lease and several other 
claims. (R. 711-70.) Wolf Mountain also filed a separate action against ASCU and 
others under the Ground Lease. (R. 771-817.) Those cases and others were consolidated 
into this current case. (R. 577-78.) 
Throughout this litigation, it has been commonly understood that only Summit 
County had the right to seek arbitration of disputes under the SPA Agreement's 
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arbitration clause. In fact, on April 24, 2009, Wolf Mountain again argued at the trial 
court that the arbitration provision does not apply because Summit County had not 
declared a default per the terms of that provision. (R. 3164 (66:11-69:4).) 
On March 12, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Amend its pleadings to add 
other SPA Agreement parties to the litigation that had refused to give land to the new golf 
course design as third party defendants, on the ground that all parties needed to be before 
the trial court as part of any remedy regarding the new design of the golf course. (R. 
2490-91, 2013-28.) On April 29, 2009, the trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to 
add other parties, concluding that the SPA Agreement "require[s] arbitration" and that 
"any claim by Wolf that the SPA agreement was violated in some way is subject to the 
mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." (R. 3082.) 
Accordingly, on May 15, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Demand for Arbitration 
against all parties to the SPA Agreement that had not given land for the new golf course 
design, including both third parties and ASCU. (R. 3339-51.) In addition, on May 20, 
2009, Wolf Mountain filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 3339-42.) 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
On June 26, 2009, the trial court entered its Ruling and Order denying Wolf 
Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration without oral argument. (R. 4005-36.) The 
court held that "the issues in dispute in this case may very well be arbitrable under the 
broad arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement," but denied Wolf Mountain's Motion 
because it held that Wolf Mountain "has waived its right to arbitration by its actions to 
this juncture." (R. 4028-34.) This appeal followed. 
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D. Statement of Facts. 
In 1997, pursuant to a certain "Ground Lease," Wolf Mountain leased the real 
property (the "Property") now known as "The Canyons Ski Resort" to ASCU and 
American Skiing Company, Inc., ASCU's parent company ("ASC"). (R. 223 at Exh. A.) 
Under the Ground Lease, ASCU is required to pay Wolf Mountain annual rent payments. 
(R. 223 at Exh. A, p.2-5.) More importantly, ASCU is required to "produce and submit 
to Summit County for approval, and exercise its best efforts to maintain in place a master 
plan" to complete residential and commercial real development of 5,000,000 square feet 
of the Property. (R. 223 at Exh. A, p.28.) When it develops a parcel of the Property, 
ASCU is required to pay Wolf Mountain 11% of the costs of constructing the buildings 
and improvements included in the development. (R. 223 at Exh. A, p.27.) Accordingly, 
ASCU's development of the Property is the source of the vast majority of ASCU's 
payments to Wolf Mountain under the Ground Lease. (Id. p.2-5, 27.) 
Pursuant to the Ground Lease, and to direct the development of the Property and 
surrounding parcels, in 1999, ASC, ASCU, Wolf Mountain, Summit County, and 
numerous landowners who are not parties to this litigation (the "Third Parties") entered 
into a certain Amended and Restated Development Agreement for the Canyons Specially 
Planned Area (the "SPA Agreement"). (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A.) 
There are approximately 33 Third Parties, many of which are smaller entities or 
family partnerships. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A (signature pages).) In addition, the SPA 
Agreement affects 7768 acres of land. (Id. at Exh. A p.l.) The SPA Agreement's terms 
and conditions "run with the land," and the Agreement is also "binding on the successors 
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and assigns of the Developers in the ownership or development of any portion of the 
Property." {Id. at Exh. A p.63, 65.) 
The SPA Agreement provides for orderly and expedited development of the 
Property and surrounding parcels under the direction of Summit County. (R. 3343-51 at 
Exh. B, p.2-4.) The SPA Agreement requires, inter alia, that ASCU complete the 
construction of a public golf course on the Property (the "Golf Course"), and that the 
parties reach an agreement by February 13, 2000 to set aside lands for the construction of 
the Golf Course. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. B, p.29.) To date, ASCU has not begun 
construction of the Golf Course. 
Beginning in 1999, ASCU's parent company, ASC, experienced significant 
financial difficulties. ASC has since filed articles of dissolution. (R. 3330-3333.) 
Beginning in 2000, ASCU's development of the Property dropped dramatically. (R. 672-
77.) In addition, beginning in 2002, Summit County placed ASCU in several "soft 
defaults" of the SPA Agreement due to ASCU's failure to construct the Golf Course. (R. 
4541 at Exh. A at 8 flf 23).) In 2004, ASCU and Summit County negotiated a standstill 
agreement, halting ASCU's development of the Property until ASCU completed the 
construction of the Golf Course. (R. 231 at f 28, 4541 at Exh. A at 9 flf 27).) 
In 2006, Wolf Mountain had issued multiple Notices of Default to ASCU under 
the Ground Lease, alleging that ASCU had failed to transfer the land underlying a 
proposed 35-lot subdivision, improperly pledged the Ground Lease as collateral, and 
substantially altered Wolf Mountain's own lease of a major portion of the Property 
without even notifying Wolf Mountain. (R. 1-12 at Exh. K, 729-32, 746, 753-55.) 
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In response, ASCU sued to enjoin Wolf Mountain from terminating the Ground 
Lease. (R. 1-34.) ASCU then amended its complaint to allege numerous claims under 
the Ground Lease and SPA Agreement. (R. 223-60.) Wolf Mountain moved to dismiss 
or sever the new claims filed in ASCU's Complaint, which the trial court denied. (R. 
392-423, 525-26.) 
In addition, Wolf Mountain filed a counterclaim against ASCU and others under 
the Ground Lease and SPA Agreement. (R. 711-770.) Wolf Mountain did not allege 
arbitration as an affirmative defense. (R. 711-817). Wolf Mountain also filed a separate 
suit containing the same claims. Those two matters and other related cases were 
consolidated into this current case. (R. 577-78, 1595-99.) 
Many of the claims ASCU alleges against Wolf Mountain arise out of the SPA 
Agreement, including: 
a. That Wolf Mountain breached contract and the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by 
i. "failing to convey the required portions of its land for the golf course 
development project," a requirement of the SPA Agreement (R. 246, 
248); 
ii. refusing to permit the golf course transaction to close as scheduled 
on April 21, 2006 ,or at any time thereafter (R. 246, 248); and 
iii. "failing to consent to and execute necessary documents to facilitate 
the development of the specially planned area," the subject of the 
SPA Agreement (R. 246, 248); 
b. That Wolf Mountain intentionally interfered with ASCU's prospective 
economic relations under rights ASCU obtained "pursuant to . . . the SPA-
Agreement" (R. 249-50); 
c. That "A dispute exists between the parties regarding their respective 
obligations under . . . the SPA Agreement for development of a golf 
course," seeking declaratory judgment thereon (R. 251-52); and 
d. That "ASCU is entitled to a decree of specific performance requiring Wolf 
to convey the requested portions of its land for the golf development 
project" (R. 253-54). 
11 
Many of Wolf Mountain's counterclaims against ASCU also arise out of the SPA 
Agreement, including that: 
a. ASCU breached contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by failing to fulfill its development obligations under the . . . SPA 
Agreement. . . including, but not limited to . . . Frostwood [and the] Golf 
course" (R. 759,761); 
b. ASCU committed trespass to chattels and/or conversion by its acts relative 
to the SPA Agreement and golf course development (R. 764); and 
c. ASCU committed a prima facie tort by its acts relative to the SPA 
Agreement and golf course development (R. 765). 
ASCU's claims and Wolf Mountain's counterclaims set forth above are referred to herein 
as the "SPA Agreement Claims." 
ASCU and Wolf Mountain allege a number of claims against each other that do 
not arise out of the SPA Agreement, including: (1) six different breaches of the Ground 
Lease and the inherent covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory judgment 
by ASCU against Wolf Mountain; and (2) seven different breaches of the Ground Lease 
and the inherent covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, intentional interference, trespass to chattels/conversion, prima facie 
tort, quiet title, and indemnification claims by Wolf Mountain against ASCU (all 
collectively, the "Remaining Claims") (R. 757-69). 
The parties halted the litigation of this case for months at a time on three different 
occasions. "In February 2007, an agreed-to standstill was put in place to allow the parties 
to attempt to consummate sales of their interests to third parties." (R. 2346.) None of the 
parties pursued this litigation for an additional period of several months while they were 
engaged in another case that was moving forward on an expedited schedule. (R. 2346.) 
In addition, after the parties began to actively pursue this case again, in November 2008, 
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they agreed to the appointment of a Special Master to resolve their discovery disputes, 
but the appointment of the Special Master itself consumed approximately three more 
months. (R. 2108-09, 2276-81, 3422-23.) 
Section 5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement requires arbitration of certain disputes that 
arise thereunder. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.) That clause states: 
5.8.1 Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained herein shall 
not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended Agreement, then every such 
continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator 
agreed upon by the parties . . . . 
(R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.) 
However, prior to April 29, 2009, Wolf Mountain believed and asserted to the trial 
court that the SPA Agreement's arbitration provision did not apply to claims asserted by 
any party other than Summit County, and therefore did not apply to the claims that are 
the subject of this litigation. On April 24, 2009, Wolf Mountain argued at the trial court 
that the arbitration provision does not apply because Summit County had not declared a 
default per the terms of that provision: 
The arbitration provision, Section 5.8.1 provides for binding arbitration but 
only in the event the default mechanism contained therein shall not 
sufficiently resolve the dispute under this amended agreement. It doesn't 
say . . . that all disputes arising under this agreement must be submitted to 
binding arbitration. It doesn't say that. All it says is that in the event that 
the default mechanism doesn't work and it doesn't get it resolved . . . then 
you go to arbitration. Well, there hasn't been any default declared by the 
county against these third parties so that provision just doesn't apply. It in 
no way preempts. There's not a requirement that Wolf Mountain has to go 
to arbitration to resolve any disputes under the SPA Development 
Agreement. 
(R. 3164 (66:11-69:4).) 
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Summit County has also asserted in a recent opinion that it alone had the right to 
demand arbitration under the SPA Agreement with a defaulting party. (R. 4541 at Exh. A 
at 7 flf 20)). The County explained: "§ 5.8.1 discusses the right of the County and a 
defaulting party to pursue Binding Arbitration, where default mechanisms under the 
Amended Agreement, which would include equitable remedies (rescission and specific 
performance), do not resolve a dispute." (Id.) (emphasis added). The County then 
declared: "Binding arbitration is not and shall not be invoked under § 5.8.1 and the 
County shall not terminate the entire [SPA Agreement] at this time." (R. 4541 at Exh. A 
at 37 (f 16)) (emphasis added). 
On March 12, 2009, prior to the deadline to file motions to add parties, Wolf 
Mountain filed a Motion for Leave to Amend to add nine additional Third Parties as 
parties to this case, so that all affected parties would be in one forum and bound by the 
same rulings with respect to the SPA Agreement. (R. 2490-91, 2019.) 
On April 29, 2009, the trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to add other 
parties, concluding that the SPA Agreement "require[s] arbitration" and that "any 
claim by Wolf that the SPA agreement was violated in some way is subject to the 
mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." (R. 3082) (emphasis added). In 
a subsequent Order, the trial court confirmed this holding: "In its April 29, 2009 Ruling, 
this Court acknowledged that disputes, differences or disagreements arising under the 
SPA Agreement are subject to arbitration, pursuant to § 5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement." 
(R. 4026.) 
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In accordance with the district court's April 29, 2009 Ruling, and to bring all 
related parties into the same forum,1 on May 15, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Demand 
for Arbitration. (R. 3477-86.) The Demand included not only ASCU, but nine additional 
Third Parties as well. (Id.) In addition, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Compel 
Arbitration. (R. 3339-42.) 
As of the date of this filing, fact discovery has not been completed in this case. 
(See Docket). Prior to the date that Wolf Mountain filed its Motion to Compel 
Arbitration, no expert reports had been provided, no expert discovery had been taken, and 
no motions for summary judgment had been filed. (R. 2013-2028; Docket in trial court.) 
However, the parties had taken a number of depositions, subpoenaed third parties, and 
served written interrogatories upon one another. (See Record Index.) 
On June 26, 2009, the district court issued a Ruling and Order denying Wolf 
Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration (the "Ruling and Order"). (R. 4005-36.) In its 
Ruling and Order, the trial court stated: 
[Mjany claims in this case relate to . . . the SPA Agreement.... At a 
minimum, the claims at issue in this case are collateral to the SPA 
Agreement by implicating the parties' rights and obligations under the SPA 
Agreement. Thus, the issues in dispute in this case may very well be 
arbitrable under the broad arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement 
1
 See also October 12, 2009 Status Conference with Special Master 34:21-35:11 (R. 
pending supplemental record index - not yet numbered) ("That meant that the only forum 
that we had to get everybody in having a stake in the claims being asserted under the spa 
agreement, to avoid multiple different suits by same parties on the same issue with 
potential inconsistent results, was to go the arbitration route. And so after he made the 
ruling that he did . . . that those claims were governed by the arbitration clause, we filed 
the motion to compel arbitration. So that was the incentive behind it was to get everybody 
having a stake in the claims in one forum so they'd all be bound by whatever the result 
was. So that was the motivation for doing that. We didn't have the same opportunity to 
do that under the ground lease because it doesn't have an arbitration clause."). 
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because of the agreement's relation to the parties' claims regarding the golf 
course development project and specially planned area. 
(R. 4027-28.) 
However, citing Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 
1992), the trial court ruled that Wolf Mountain had waived its right to seek arbitration 
under the SPA Agreement because it had substantially participated in litigation: 
Regardless of Wolf s awareness, a waiver of the right to arbitration may be 
inferred by the parties' actions which demonstrate substantial participation 
in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. The ASC 
Parties contend that instead of immediately moving to compel arbitration, 
Wolf filed a motion to dismiss, and after that was denied, filed its own 
separate suit, answer and counterclaim. Wolf also failed to raise the right to 
arbitration as an affirmative defense. Wolf has extensively litigated this 
case over the past three years. A brief review of the docket for these 
consolidated cases shows that Wolf has taken actions inconsistent with an 
intent to arbitrate by conducting discovery for about three years, taking and 
defending numerous depositions, and extensive motion practice, similar to 
what occurred in Smile Inc. Asia. The case now as of this date consumes 
37 volumes, growing daily. Unlike what occurred in Central Florida 
Investments, Wolf has failed to ensure that the court and parties involved 
were aware of its intent to seek arbitration. Therefore, Wolfs actions during 
the past three years regarding these consolidated cases have demonstrated 
its willingness to engage in litigation to a point inconsistent with an intent 
to arbitrate. 
(R. 4030-31). In addition, the Court ruled that prejudice would result to ASCU if 
arbitration were permitted: 
Hence, when looking at the extent of discovery and motion practice that has 
occurred over the past three years and the expense of this litigation to the 
parties at this point, the court finds and concludes that the ASC Parties have 
been prejudiced by Wolfs late assertion of its right to arbitrate under the 
SPA Agreement. 
(R. 4033.) The trial court ruled on Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration 
without an evidentiary hearing or even oral argument. (R. 4007.) 
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On July 1, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed its Notice of Appeal herein, appealing the 
trial court's Ruling and Order denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See Docket in 
this appeal). On July 8, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Stay the SPA Agreement 
Claims in the trial court. (R. 4244-62.) However, the trial court denied that Motion too. 
(R. 4546-66.) 
On August 27, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion in this Court to Stay the SPA 
Agreement Claims pending this Court's decision on appeal, which this Court granted. 
(See Docket in this appeal). No party has sought a stay of the Remaining Claims. Trial is 
presently scheduled to begin in this case on April 13, 2010. (R. 4423.) 
On October 12, 2009, the Special Master assigned to this case, Scott Daniels, 
conducted a status conference call with the parties regarding discovery in the case (the 
"Status Conference"). (R. pending supplemental index. ) During the Status Conference, 
Wolf Mountain's counsel pointed out that it did not know the evidence or measure of 
ASCU's damages for the Remaining Claims because ASCU had failed to properly 
respond to Wolf Mountain's interrogatories: 
"I guess we have an issue understanding what damages ASCU claims 
relate to the remaining claims. We have an expert report that appears to 
be geared around the spa claims, you know, the failure-to-develop kinds of 
claims, and, you know, we have that available to us. We had sent out an 
interrogatory asking specifically about the damages resulting from the 
various types of claims, which would have included the, you know, the 
nonstayed claims. And really the only answer we got to that was, well, 
you look at the documents we've produced and the depositions that have 
taken p lace . . . . 
This document was filed after the initially record index was ordered by this Court, and 
thus there is not yet a record citation for this document. 
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"We don't know exactly what they're claiming. If they're still claiming, 
for example, any kind of damage resulting from inability to develop, then 
everything that we have in the course of discovery would still be related to 
the nonstayed claims. If they're talking about something narrower, then it 
could be that there are parts of the discovery that are not related to those 
claims, which, then, I guess, we could discuss whether those are part of the 
stay. . . .[T]o have a very intelligent discussion of any of those items 
requires some kind of explanation from ASCU as to what their damage 
claim is with respect to the nonstayed claims." 
"But, you know, until we get an answer to our interrogatories, we don't 
know what that is. We don't know what the scope of it is." 
(R. pending at 4:25-6:14, 19:13-16 (emphases added); see also id. at 4:9-12, 8:19-24, 
18:1-5.) 
In response, ASCU's counsel asserted that all of its evidence of damages related to 
both the SPA Agreement Claims and the Remaining Claims: 
"Our damage claims are because they interfered with our ability and 
right to develop the property, whether those do or don't relate to the 
spa. . . . separating damages into a bucket that are related to the spa and a 
set that are not is, first of all, unworkable, and, second, I don't think 
anything we're required to do." 
"Well, and we are seeking [for the nonspa claims] everything that's in our 
expert report . . . . I said we are seeking the full extent of our claims in our report 
(R. pending at 9:12-15, 18-21; 21:6-7, 12-13 (emphasis added).) 
Accordingly, Wolf Mountain's counsel asserted that if ASCU's counsel's 
statements were true, and all of the discovery related to both stayed and Remaining 
Claims, it needed to obtain such discovery for trial: 
"I think as long as you're asserting a nonstayed claim, and there's 
questions that are relevant to that, the fact that they're relevant also to 
a stayed claim doesn't make them nondiscoverable." 
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"I understand John [Lund, ASCU's counsel,] to be saying now that all of the 
damages relate, in his mind, to ground-lease claims, maybe not uniquely 
ground-lease claims but at least ground-lease claims that he would say are not 
stayed at this point, and, therefore, I would guess any document that we have 
. • • we could ask a question about [because it] would relate to those claims." 
(R.pending at 21:22-25; 22:19-25; see also id. at 25:10-20, 26:16-20 (emphasis added).) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Arbitration Act mandates that the "court, upon motion of any party 
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4(l) (1999) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the 
parties' SPA Agreement contains an arbitration agreement among Wolf Mountain, 
ASCU, and several Third Parties. Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration 
of the parties' disputes under the SPA Agreement. Accordingly, the trial court should 
have ordered arbitration. 
Instead, the trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration, 
ruling that Wolf Mountain had "waived" the SPA Agreement's arbitration provision 
pursuant to this Court's standard in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 
356 (Utah 1992) through (1) "substantially participating in the underlying litigation to a 
point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate" (2) "resulting in prejudice to" the opposing 
party, ASCU. Id. at 360. 
However, Wolf Mountain did not "intentionally relinquish a known right" to 
arbitration under the SPA Agreement, per the definition of "waiver." Soter's, Inc. v. 
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993). In fact, both Wolf 
Mountain and Summit County expressly stated on the record their understanding and 
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belief that only Summit County had the right to seek arbitration under the SPA 
Agreement. (R. 3164 (66:11-69:4), 4541 atExh. A at 37 fl[ 16).) Instead, Wolf 
Mountain had timely moved to add the Third Parties to this litigation, to ensure that all 
affected persons were in one forum and avoid inconsistent outcomes or "redoing" of 
proceedings. The trial court denied this motion, holding that the SPA Agreement 
required arbitration with the Third Parties. The trial court's statements in that ruling is 
what prompted Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration - which the trial court 
also denied. Because Wolf Mountain's intention was express, the trial court did not have 
to infer Wolf Mountain's intentions under Chandler. 
Nevertheless, even under Chandler and its progeny, Wolf Mountain did not 
"clearly manifestf] an intent to waive its right to arbitration." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 
UT 58, ]j 16. Its participation in litigation has primarily consisted of fact discovery and 
related pretrial motions, which even to date have not been completed. "If participation in 
discovery and pretrial motions, standing alone, irrespective of the parties' intentions, 
were to constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring arbitration 
would be damaged." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, \ 33. 
Moreover, ASCU is not prejudiced by the conduct of fact discovery to date in this 
case because it admits that such discovery pertains both to arbitrable and nonarbitrable 
claims. "[N]o prejudice results if the discovery relates to nonarbitrable claims which will 
be severed and separately litigated." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17. In sum, ASCU 
does not meet its "heavy burden" of overcoming this Court's "strong presumption against 
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waiver" of arbitration, which is highly favored and supported by strong public policy 
interests. Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58, ^  14. 
Finally, even if Wolf Mountain's actions did meet the Soter and Chandler tests for 
waiver - which they do not - waiver of arbitration under Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah 
Arbitration Act violates the Utah Constitution. The Constitution grants all powers of 
government to the Legislature that have not been otherwise allocated, whereas the 
jurisdiction of district courts is "limited by this constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST, 
art. VIII, § 5; see also art. VI, § 1. The district court may not constitutionally "exercise... 
powers properly belonging to" the "Legislative" department. UTAH CONST, art. V, § 1. 
When a statute is mandatory, it is jurisdictional, and the district court cannot apply the 
equitable doctrine of waiver to avoid its mandate. 
Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration Act states in mandatory terms: "The 
court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall 
order the parties to arbitrate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). By its plain 
language, arbitration "shall" be ordered, and ordering arbitration is "the essence o f the 
statutory scheme. Id. Arbitration "may not be" denied, even if the trial court determines 
that "issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have 
not been shown." Id. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold otherwise. 
Finally, "waiver do[es] not in general apply to transactions that are forbidden by 
statute or are contrary to public policy." Am. Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 
523, 528 (10th Cir. 1966). Arbitration is mandated by statute and supported by important 
public policy. 
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Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling that Wolf Mountain 
waived arbitration under § 78-3 la-4 (1999) and remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with that ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WOLF MOUNTAIN DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATE 
CLAIMS UNDER THE SPA AGREEMENT. 
A. This Court Maintains a "Strong Presumption Against Waiver of 
the Right to Arbitrate/9 
Arbitration is not only highly favored in Utah, it is also backed by strong 
public policy and numerous practical benefits. This Court "has recognized the 
important public policy behind enforcing arbitration agreements as an 'approved, 
practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court 
congestion.'" Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58, ^  14, 96 P.3d 911 (quoting 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992)); 
Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996) 
("We begin by noting that the Utah Arbitration Act 'reflects long-standing public 
policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.'" 
(quoting Allredv. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996)). 
In addition, this Court has repeatedly held that "[i]n light of this policy, 
there is a strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate." Cedar 
Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58, *h 14 (quoting Cent. Fla. Invs.f 2002 UT 3, If 24); 
accord Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, H 12, 114 P.3d 580 ("We have recognized 
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that arbitration has much to recommend i t . . . and have accordingly noted 4a 
strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate'") (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, this Court has held that the party claiming waiver of the right 
to arbitration bears a "heavy burden" to prove that such has occurred. Cent. Fla. 
Invs., 2002 UT 3, ^ f 24 (citing Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int'l, AG, 770 F.2d 
416, 420 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The burden on one seeking to prove a waiver of 
arbitration is a heavy one")). 
In this case, ASCU has not met, and cannot meet, its "heavy burden" of 
proving that Wolf Mountain has waived arbitration under the SPA Agreement. 
B. Wolf Mountain Did Not "Intentionally Relinquish a Known 
Right" to Arbitration. 
It is axiomatic that waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of a known 
right." Soter's, Inc. v. DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d935, 939-40 
(Utah 1993). This Court has applied the same standard to waiver of arbitration 
rights: "Consistent with our general waiver jurisprudence, we have held that a 
'waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional/ and a court may infer waiver 
'only if the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended 
to disregard its right to arbitrate/" Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at f 14 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ^ 24); 
accord McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, f^ 20, 20 P.3d 
901 (same). Accordingly, this Court will "infer the original intent of the party 
asking for arbitration on a case-by-case basis." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at f^ 23 
(citing Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358 n.8). 
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1. Wolf Mountain Did Not Believe That it Had an 
Arbitration Right 
In this case, Wolf Mountain's "intent" need not be inferred, since it 
expressly stated its intent on the record before the trial court. From the outset of 
the litigation, Wolf Mountain directly manifested its intent and good faith belief 
that it did not have the right to pursue arbitration under the SPA Agreement. 
Specifically, Wolf Mountain asserted that the SPA Agreement's arbitration 
provision does not apply to the current litigation because Summit County has not 
declared a default and sought arbitration per the terms of that provision. (R. 3164 
(66:11-69:4)). In a hearing before the trial court regarding its Motion for Leave to 
Amend to add the Third Parties, Wolf Mountain's counsel reiterated this long-held 
position, stating: 
The arbitration provision, Section 5.8.1 provides for binding arbitration but 
only in the event the default mechanism contained therein shall not 
sufficiently resolve the dispute under this amended agreement. It doesn't 
say . . . that all disputes arising under this agreement must be submitted to 
binding arbitration. It doesn't say that. All it says is that in the event that 
the default mechanism doesn't work and it doesn't get it resolved . . . then 
you go to arbitration. Well, there hasn't been any default declared by the 
county against these third parties so that provision just doesn't apply. It in 
no way preempts. There's not a requirement that Wolf Mountain has to go 
to arbitration to resolve any disputes under the SPA Development 
Agreement. 
(R. 3164 (66:11-69:4).) There is no dispute that this statement reflected Wolf 
Mountain's position from the outset of the litigation. 
In addition, Wolf Mountain is not alone is asserting this position. For 
example, on July 30, 2009 - months after the trial court determined that Wolf 
Mountain was required to demand arbitration from the Third Parties - Summit 
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County came to the same conclusion. In its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law Regarding the Enforcement and Status o f the SPA Agreement, the County 
stated that under Section 5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement, it alone had the right to 
demand arbitration under the SPA Agreement with a defaulting party. (R. 4541 at 
Exh. A at 7 (1f 20). The County explained: "§ 5.8.1 discusses the right of the 
County and a defaulting party to pursue Binding Arbitration, where default 
mechanisms under the Amended Agreement, which would include equitable 
remedies (rescission and specific performance), do not resolve a dispute." (Id.) 
(emphasis added). However, the County then declared: "Binding arbitration is 
not and shall not be invoked under § 5.8.1 and the County shall not terminate the 
entire [SPA Agreement] at this time." (R. 4541 at Exh. A at 37 fl| 16) (emphasis 
added).) 
2. Only the Trial Court's April 29, 2009 Ruling Caused Wolf 
Mountain to Change its Position. 
On March 12, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed its Motion for Leave to Amend to add 
the Third Parties to the litigation prior to the deadline established under the case 
management order. (R. 2490-91, 2019.) More importantly, Wolf Mountain filed that 
Motion to ensure that all affected SPA Agreement parties were brought together into one 
forum, so that all would be bound by the same rulings with respect to the SPA 
Agreement and no one would suffer from inconsistent rulings or lack of participation in 
the resolution. (R. 2490-91, 2019; fn.l, supra) See, e.g., UTAH R. Civ. P. 19(a) 
(joinder is mandatory for persons whose absence may "leave any of the persons already 
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parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations"). 
However, on April 29, 2009, the trial court rejected Wolf Mountain's arguments 
that the Third Parties must be added to this case to resolve Wolf Mountain's disputes 
with them under the SPA Agreement. (R. 3065-87.) In so doing, the trial court 
determined that "the SPA Agreement does require arbitration." (R. 3082.) The trial 
court added: "Thus, any claim by Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated in some 
way is subject to the mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." Id. 
3. Wolf Mountain Now Understands that the SPA 
Agreement Provides Arbitration. 
As directed by the trial court, Wolf Mountain now understands that the SPA 
Agreement's arbitration clause provides for arbitration of disputes arising thereunder. 
That clause states: 
5.8.1 Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism 
contained herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended 
Agreement, then every such continuing dispute, difference, and 
disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator agreed upon by the 
parties . . . . 
(R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.) The "default mechanism" referred to in this clause is 
Section 5.1.2 et. seq. of the SPA Agreement, in which Summit County is authorized to 
give written notice to any other party to the Agreement of a default that such party has 
committed thereunder. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.57-59.) Reference to this "default 
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mechanism" is what induced Wolf Mountain, Summit County, and others generally to 
believe that only Summit County could induce arbitration.3 
However, that "default mechanism" ultimately does not control the dispute 
resolution in this case. In their arbitration clause, the parties explicitly agreed to 
arbitrate any "dispute under this Amended Agreement" - not just disputes invoking the 
default mechanism. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.) If a "dispute under" the SPA 
Agreement arises, then "such dispute "shall be referred to" arbitration. (Id.) All 
disputes under the Agreement invoke arbitration unless they are resolved by the default 
mechanism. 
The SPA Agreement Claims have not been resolved by the default mechanism. In 
addition, the default mechanism regards County-assigned defaults only, not disputes 
among other parties. (Id.) Accordingly, the SPA Agreement Claims fall under the SPA 
Agreement's arbitration clause and should be arbitrated. 
Importantly, if there is any question whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a 
particular dispute, this Court construes arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration: 
Moreover, if there is any question as to whether the parties agreed to 
resolve their disputes through arbitration or litigation, i.e., through the filing 
of a complaint and recording of a lis pendens, we interpret the agreement 
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration. "It is the policy of 
the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, 'in keeping 
with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the 
parties have agreed not to litigate.'" 
Notably, in its recent filings on Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration, ASCU 
has not taken any position regarding who has the right to seek arbitration under this 
clause. 
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Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at \ 16 (quoting Reed v. Davis County Sch. DisL, 892 P.2d 
1063, 1065 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (quoting Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys., Inc., 
731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986)) and citing McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2001 UT 
31, \ 14, 20 P.3d 901 ("It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner that 
favors arbitration." (quoting Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479)); Chandler, 833 P.2d at 
358 (stating "this court has also recognized the strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration 'as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and 
easing court congestion.'"). 
4. Wolf Mountain Promptly Sought Arbitration, 
To adhere to the trial court's Ruling and bring all affected parties into one forum, 
Wolf Mountain has sought to arbitrate the SPA Agreement claims. Only 16 days after 
the trial court's determination that SPA Agreement Claims must be arbitrated, Wolf 
Mountain filed its Demand for Arbitration in the American Arbitration Association, 
followed by a Motion to Compel Arbitration in the trial court. (R. 3477-86, 3339-42.) 
The trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 4005-
36.) It did so on the sole ground that Wolf Mountain had waived its right to arbitration. 
(R. 4030-31.) Thus, Wolf Mountain is ostensibly left with neither litigation nor 
arbitration as a forum in which to resolve SPA Agreement disputes with all parties. 
However, Wolf Mountain's prior position against any right to arbitrate, as set forth 
above and corroborated by Summit County, did not constitute an "intentional 
relinquishment of a known right" to arbitration. Soter's, 857 P.2d at 939-40. 
Considering Wolf Mountain's prior position regarding arbitration, reversed only by the 
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trial court's recent ruling asserting that arbitration was the only forum that would include 
all SPA Agreement parties, as well as Utah courts' strong presumption against finding 
that a party waived its right to arbitration, this Court should hold that Wolf Mountain has 
not waived its right to arbitration in this case. 
C. Wolf Mountain Did Not "Substantially Participate in Litigation" 
Sufficient to Waive Arbitration. 
As set forth above, Wolf Mountain's intent regarding arbitration was explicit and 
need not be inferred. However, even if this Court determined that such intent was not 
explicit, ASCU does not prove that Wolf Mountain met both prongs of this Court's two-
part test for inferring intent, as set forth in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 
833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992). This Court has recently set forth this test as follows: 
First, the party seeking arbitration must have substantially participated in 
the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. . 
. . Second, the party's participation in the litigation must have resulted in 
prejudice to the opposing party. 
Baker, 2005 UT 32 at j^ 13 (citations and quotations omitted). 
"The primary purpose of the first prong of Chandler's two-part waiver test is to 
allow a court to evaluate whether the party asserting the right to arbitrate has clearly 
manifested an intent to waive its right to arbitration." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at 
1f 16; see also Baker, 2005 UT 32 at j^ 13. However, as set forth above, Wolf Mountain 
expressly stated its position that it did not have such a right. Notably, ASCU has never 
disputed this position or asserted that Wolf Mountain did have the right to arbitration 
under the SPA Agreement. 
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Regarding Wolf Mountain's participation in litigation, it is true that, prior to filing 
its Motion to Compel Arbitration, Wolf Mountain engaged in fact discovery and 
discovery motions in this case. (See Docket.) However, much of that fact discovery was 
necessitated by the demands of the case and to adhere to the Rules of Civil Procedure in 
regards thereto. In addition, participation in discovery and pretrial motions does not 
independently manifest an intent to waiver arbitration. In Central Florida Investments 
("CFI"), CFI alleged that Parkwest Associates ("PWA") had waived its right to 
arbitration by participating in pretrial discovery and motions. This Court disagreed: 
PWA was, to a certain extent, compelled to file these pleadings to comply 
with the rules of civil procedure. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
imposed requirements and deadlines on PWA to participate as it did in 
pretrial discovery and in the filing of pretrial motions. If we were to hold 
that PWA's participation in the litigation process, particularly 
discovery, regardless of its intent regarding arbitration or the extent of 
its participation in litigation, the result would be that in subsequent 
cases parties would arguably always waive arbitration in complying 
with deadlines imposed by the rules governing litigation in the courts. 
Furthermore, we must factor in the strong policy of the law in Utah in favor 
of arbitration, the strong presumption against waiver of the right to 
arbitrate, and the burden of establishing substantial participation on the 
party claiming waiver. If participation in discovery and pretrial 
motions, standing alone, irrespective of the parties1 intentions, were to 
constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring 
arbitration would be damaged. 
Cent Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ffif 32-33 (all emphases added). 
Furthermore, prior to filing the Motion, no party had filed expert reports, 
conducted expert discovery, served motions for summary judgment, or completed 
other pretrial tasks. (See Docket.) Indeed, even fact discovery has not been 
completed in this case, and the parties are preparing to receive thousands of 
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additional documents and take multiple additional depositions. (R. 4585-4615, 
4662-66, Rulings pending supp. record at 9/4/09 and 10/23/09.) 
Accordingly, considering Wolf Mountain's expressly-stated position that it 
did not have the right to arbitration, ASCU's acquiescence in that position, and 
Summit County's corroboration, Wolf Mountain's participation in primarily fact 
discovery was reasonable under the circumstances and does not give rise to an 
inference of waiver. At the very least, it does not overcome the "strong 
presumption against" waiver. Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at f^ 14. 
D. Wolf Mountain's Participation in Litigation Did Not Result in 
Prejudice to ASCU. 
Even if Wolf Mountain's "participation in litigation" did show an intent to 
participate in litigation - which it does not - such is insufficient to overcome this 
Court's "strong presumption against waiver." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at 
T| 14. That is because ASCU must also prove the second prong of the Chandler 
test - that Wolf Mountain's "participation in the litigation must have resulted in 
prejudice to" ASCU. Baker, 2005 UT 32 at \ 13. 
Crucially, after setting forth the "prejudice" prong, this Court declared in 
Chandler. "However, no prejudice results if the discovery relates to 
nonarbitrable claims which will be severed and separately litigated." 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17 (citing Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 
889 (2d Cir. 1985)); Dickinson v. Heinold Sees., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 642 (7th 
Cir.1981)). 
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In this case, ASCU's counsel has admitted that all fact discovery in this 
case relates not only to the arbitrable SPA Agreement Claims, but also the 
nonarbitrable claims in this case. (R. pending supp. at 10/12/09 Transcript at 9:12-
15, 18-21; 21:6-7, 12-13). 
The SPA Agreement Claims are the subject of this appeal, and arbitration 
of them has been stayed. {See WM Mem. in Supp. Motion to Stay at 5-7, Order 
dated 09/30/09 granting Motion in this Appeal.) However, there are several other 
Remaining Claims in this case that are now being separately litigated. {Id.; WM 
Response to Emergency Petition in this Appeal.) In a recent Status Conference, 
Wolf Mountain pointed out that it did not know the evidence or measure of 
ASCU's damages for the Remaining Claims because ASCU had failed to properly 
respond to Wolf Mountain's interrogatories. (R. pending supp. at 10/12/09 
Transcript at 4:9-12, 4:25-6:14, 8:19-24, 18:1-5, and 19:13-16). In response, 
ASCU's counsel asserted that all of its evidence of damages related to both the 
SPA Agreement Claims and the Remaining Claims. {See id. at 9:12-15, 18-21; 
21:6-7, 12-13). Specifically, ASCU's counsel stated: 
"Our damage claims are because they interfered with our ability and 
right to develop the property, whether those do or don't relate to the 
spa. . . . separating damages into a bucket that are related to the spa and a 
set that are not is, first of all, unworkable, and, second, I don't think 
anything we're required to do." 
"Well, and we are seeking [for the nonspa claims] everything that's in 
our expert report . . . . I said we are seeking the full extent of our claims 
in our report 
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(Id.) (emphasis added). Accordingly, ASCU is not prejudiced by the fact 
discovery conducted in this case because such "relates to nonarbitrable claims 
which will be severed and separately litigated." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17. 
ASCU has recently confirmed this position in its "Emergency" Petition to 
this Court. There, ASCU argued that "the completion of [fact] discovery will 
impose no prejudice on any party since the evidence gathered could be used in 
arbitration as well as litigation," and that "any discovery conducted can and will 
be utilized in any future arbitration." (Emerg. Pet. at 3, 10) (emphasis added). 
ASCU also agreed with the following statement from the Special Master: 
the evidence relating to these [SPA Agreement] claims is so interwoven 
with evidence relating to the other claims that it is impractical to require 
witnesses and especially non-parties to separate documents into stayed and 
non-stayed categories. Furthermore, the discovery needs to be done 
whether the SPA Claims are tried or arbitrated. 
(Emerg. Pet. at 11 (quoting the October 14, 2009 Report and Recommendation, 
attached to the Petition as Exhibit "B")). Therefore, ASCU can scarcely claim that 
it has been "prejudiced" by the conduct of discovery regarding the arbitrable 
claims in this case. Its statements contradict such a claim. 
Accordingly, ASCU is not prejudiced at all by the fact discovery that has 
been conducted in this case because, by its own admission, that discovery pertains 
to the nonarbitrable, Remaining Claims in this case. (See WM Mem. in Supp. 
Motion to Stay at 5-7, Order dated 09/30/09 granting Motion in this Appeal.).4 
In Chandler, this Court also identified cases in which pretrial fact discovery was 
deemed insufficient to prejudice opposing parties to the point of requiring a waiver of 
arbitration - even when discovery did not relate to nonarbitrable claims. See Chandler, 
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II. ARBITRATION IS A MANDATORY STATUTORY DIRECTIVE 
THAT CANNOT BE WAIVED, 
Even if this Court were to determine that Wolf Mountain had "intentionally 
relinquished a known right" to arbitrate, applying the equitable doctrine of waiver to the 
mandatory statute requiring arbitration, enacted by the Legislature under the Utah 
Arbitration Act, unconstitutionally eviscerates the Legislature's exercise of legislative 
power under the Act. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Wolf 
Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration based on "waiver." 
A. Under Utah's Constitution, the Legislature Possesses AH 
Governmental Powers Not Expressly Provided to Others. 
Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides that the "Legislative power 
of the State shall be vested in (a) . . . the Legislature of the State of Utah; and (b) the 
people of the State of Utah." UTAH CONST, art. VI, § 1. This Court has further explained: 
Our Legislature is directly representative of the people of the sovereign 
state, and thus has inherently all of the powers of government except as 
otherwise specified by the State Constitution. . . . having the residuum of 
governmental power, [it] does not look to the State Constitution for the 
grant of its powers, but that Constitution only sets forth the limitations on 
its authority. Therefore, it can do any act or perform any function of 
government not specifically prohibited by the State Constitution. 
833 P.2d at 359 n. 17 (citing Sweater Bee by Banff v. Manhattan Indus., 754 F.2d 457, 
464 (2d Cir. 1985) (no prejudice from discovery because discovery can be used in 
arbitration and additional discovery can be ordered); Keating v. Sup. Court of Alameda 
County, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206 (Cal. App. 1982) (no prejudice from discovery because 
court ordered party seeking arbitration to cease discovery or extend equal discovery to 
party claiming waiver). This Court has not yet determined whether participation in 
discovery could ever independently justify a waiver. See Baker at f^ 16 n.4 ("There is 
some disagreement as to whether participating in discovery rises to the level of prejudice 
necessary to justify a waiver. We need not answer that question here . . . .") (citing 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17). 
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Wood v. Budge, 374 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
This Court has recently reaffirmed the Legislature's preeminent constitutional status. See 
Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff 2006 UT 51, \ 18, 144 P.3d 1109 ("At the time of statehood, 
the State of Utah 'committed its whole lawmaking power to the legislature, excepting 
such as is expressly or impliedly withheld by the state or federal constitution.'" (quoting 
Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Utah State Bd ofEduc, 2001 UT 2, ^ 11, 17 P.3d 1125) (citing 
UTAH CONST, art. VI, § 1); see also Bateman v. Bd. of Exam 'rs, 322 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah 
1958); Spence v. Utah State Agric. Coll, 225 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah 1956). 
B. Utah Courts' Jurisdiction is Limited by the Legislature's 
Statutes and Utah's Constitution. 
By contrast, the Utah Constitution vested specific, limited judicial powers in the 
State's Supreme Court and district courts. Among them, the Supreme Court was granted 
"appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute." 
UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 3. However, the jurisdiction of the district courts was limited 
by both the Constitution and any statute imposing limits on that jurisdiction: "The 
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute " UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5 (emphasis added). In 
addition, under the Constitution, Utah's Judicial department, including its district courts, 
was constitutionally prohibited from exercising Legislative powers: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
35 
UTAH CONST, art. V, § 1 (emphasis added); see also Kimball v. Grantsville City, 57 P. 1, 
4 (Utah 1899) ("[N]o person or persons whose duty it is to exercise the functions of one 
department can exercise any power belonging properly to either of the others, except in 
cases expressly authorized by the constitution."). 
Under this "separation of powers" doctrine, this Court has steadfastly refused to 
ignore or substitute its own wisdom for the decisions of the Legislature. See, e.g., 
Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, | 23, 61 P.3d 989 ("This court cannot ignore or strike 
down an act because it is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the 
legislature to determine.") (citation and quotations omitted); Parkinson v. Watson, 291 
P.2d 400, (Utah 1955) ("It is a rule of universal acceptance that the wisdom or 
desirability of legislation is in no wise for the courts to consider."). 
In addition, this Court has refused to interfere with legislative enactments based 
solely on policy considerations. See, e.g., Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 
1979) ("[R]respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking requires that the judiciary 
not interfere with or rewrite enactments of the Legislature where disagreement is founded 
only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable means to 
effectuate a legitimate objective."). 
Furthermore, this Court has refused to "craft a remedy where the legislature 
intends no remedy to exist." Gottling, 2002 UT 95, ^ j 23. In fact, this Court has 
reiterated that ill-advised or poor legislation, if otherwise constitutional, can be remedied 
only by an appeal to the Legislature - not the courts. See, e.g., Parkinson, 291 P.2d at 
403 ("Whether an act be ill advised or unfortunate if such it should be, does not give rise 
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to an appeal from the legislature to the courts. But the remedy for correction of 
legislation, remains with the people who elect successive legislatures."). 
C. Mandatory Statutory Rights are Jurisdictional. 
Accordingly, in fulfilling their constitutionally limited duties, Utah courts do not 
derogate from the requirements of mandatory statutes enacted by the Utah Legislature. 
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978). If a 
district court finds that a statute is mandatory, then the court is left without further 
discretion in applying the statute. See Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, ^ |20 n.2, 
183 P.3d 1052 (holding that when "a statute creates a mandatory condition," such 
"eliminates] any discretion on the part of the courts" (quoting Diener v. Diener, 2004 
UT App 314, If 12, 98 P.3d 1178) (internal quotations omitted))). District courts must 
strictly comply with the terms of such statutes. See Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail v. 
Third Dist. Ct, 2007 UT 24, ^  8, 156 P.3d 801 ("Strict compliance . . . is required when 
failure to adhere to the statute 'will affect a substantive right of one of the parties and 
possibly prejudice that party.'" (quotation omitted))); Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-
Rite, Inc., 2001 UT App 347, \ 22 n.6, 37 P.3d 1202 ("It is not the prerogative of courts . 
. . to ignore legislative mandates."). 
Furthermore, a "mandatory" designation renders the statute jurisdictional. Cache 
County v. Prop. Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 922 P.2d 758, 764 (Utah 1996) 
(citing Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706); Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 
919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (citing Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706). By contrast, 
if a statute is merely "directory," then "substantial compliance" with its requirements is 
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sufficient - so long as "no prejudice will occur as a result of failure to follow the 
direction of the statute." Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, |^ 7 (quoting Bd. of 
Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983)); accord Kennecott Copper, 
575 P.2d at 706 (requiring strict compliance because of prejudice even though the 
statutory language appeared directory). 
In determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory, this Court has held that 
"[t]here is no universal rule [of statutory construction] by which directory provisions 
may, under all circumstances, be distinguished from those which are mandatory." 
Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706; accord Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, 
H 7. Generally, "[a] designation is mandatory, and therefore jurisdictional, if it is 'of 
the essence of the thing to be done.'" Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 552 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). By contrast, "a designation is merely directory, and therefore not 
jurisdictional, if it is 'given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct 
of. . . business, and by failure to obey no prejudice will occur to those whose rights are 
protected by the statute.'" Id.; accord Stahlv. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 
(Utah 1980) ("[Generally a direction in a statute to do an act is considered 'mandatory' 
when consequences are attached to the failure to act."). However, "the fundamental 
consideration in interpreting statutes is legislative intent; and that is determined in light of 
the purpose the statute was designed to achieve." Bd. of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d at 1033; see also Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706. 
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The first and paramount consideration in divining legislative intent is the plain 
language of the statute, read as a whole with a view toward harmonizing its provisions. 
See Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, f 9. This often further requires an 
examination of "the history and background of the statute, its purpose, and the 
interpretation which will best implement that purpose." Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 
P.2d 204, 206 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted)). 
In evaluating the text of the statute, the court does not look beyond the plain 
language unless it first finds ambiguity. See Parr v. Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310, j^ 6, 117 
P.3d 1079 (citing Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998)); 
accordBrinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); State ex rel M.C v. 
K.H.C, 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("it is well established that 'where the 
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,. . . [the court] may hold that the 
construction intended by the legislature is obvious from the language used.'" (quoting 3 
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992))). 
Further, it is presumed that "the terms of a statute are used advisedly and should be given 
an interpretation and application which is in accord with their usually accepted 
meanings." Bd. ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1033 (citing Grant v. Utah 
State Land Bd, 4S5 P.2d 1035 (1971)). 
In addition, it is well-established that "'the form of the verb used in a statute, i.e., 
something may, shall, or must be done, is the single most important textual 
consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory.'" State ex rel 
M.C, 940 P.2d at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, 
39 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992)) (emphasis added). For 
example, the term "may" has been interpreted as permissive thereby giving the trial court 
a measure of discretion. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
But see Bd. ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1035. In contrast, "[w]hile 'shall' 
has been validly interpreted as directory . . . , it is usually presumed mandatory and has 
been interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions." Bd. ofEduc. v. Salt 
Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1035 (citing Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 
1974); State v. Zeimer, 347 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1960); Swift v. Smith, 201 P.2d 609 (Colo. 
1948)). 
For example, in Parr v. Stubbs, the Court of Appeals held that a lien statute 
employing the word "shall" in connection with service of process requirements was 
mandatory, and thus required strict compliance. See 2005 UT App 310, fflf 5, 7. In Parr, 
the statute at issue provided in pertinent part: "[t]he record interest holder shall serve a 
copy of the petition on the lien claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process." Id. at Tf 5 (emphasis added). In supporting its holding, 
the Court of Appeals observed that the Legislature chose to use the common and 
straightforward word "shall," which generally creates a mandatory condition. Id. at f 7. 
Finding "no reason to deviate from this common understanding," the court construed the 
statute to be mandatory. Id. 
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Board of Education v. Salt Lake 
County. See 659 P.2d at 1035. In that case, this Court held the following statutory 
provisions mandatory: 
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It is the duty of the county treasurer to pay to the treasurer of each ..., 
school district..., on the first day of each month, all moneys in his hands 
collected for and due such ... school [district] .... The county treasurer 
shall pay to the treasurer of each ... school district... [its] proportionate 
share of delinquent taxes, interest, penalty and costs on all tax sales and 
redemptions therefrom, monthly, and shall make a final settlement... on 
the last day of March of each year.... 
Such taxes shall be collected by the county officers as other taxes are 
collected and the county treasurer shall pay the same to the treasurer of 
said board within thirty days after it is collected, who shall hold the same 
subject to the order of the board of education. 
Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-7-10, 59-10-66) (emphasis added). In reaching this 
conclusion, this Court observed that the Treasurer's failure to strictly comply with the 
statutory provisions would result in prejudice to those whose rights are protected by the 
statutes. See id. at 1035. Further, this Court noted that "since 'shall', a word with a 
usually accepted mandatory connotation, has been used throughout the statutory 
provisions, the statutes in question must be interpreted strictly as they are plainly 
written." Id. (emphasis added). 
D. Because Mandatory Statutes are Jurisdictional, They Cannot Be 
Waived. 
Because mandatory statutes are jurisdictional, they cannot be waived - even by the 
parties themselves. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205; Schachtv. United States, 
398 U.S. 58 (1970); Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907). 
For example, in Whitfield v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 205 U.S. 489 (1907), 
the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case in which Aetna Life Insurance Company and 
its insured agreed to waive Aetna's coverage for death benefits if the insured committed 
suicide. See id. at 489-90. However, Missouri statutes specifically forbade suicide 
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exemptions in insurance policies except under certain circumstances that Aetna did not 
meet. See id. at 494. The Court, citing similar cases, stated with approval the following 
rule: "The legislative will, when expressed in the peremptory terms of this statute, is 
paramount and absolute, and cannot be varied or waived by the private conventions 
of the parties." Id. at 497 (emphasis added). The Court concluded: "[W]e cannot hold 
that the present [waiver] stipulation can be enforced without violating the plain terms of a 
mandatory statute which the parties have no power to alter or abrogate." Id. at 501. 
Similarly, in Bowles, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's 
dismissal of Bowles's appeal due to his failure to timely file the appeal - even though he 
made the filing within the time period provided by the district court. The Supreme Court 
reiterated its "longstanding rule" that "the requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal 
is 'mandatory and jurisdictional.'" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)). It repeated that the requirement is 
jurisdictional because the appeal period was one of the "limits enacted by Congress," and 
the Court had "repeatedly held that this statute-based filing period for civil cases is 
jurisdictional." Id. at 212. The Court elaborated: 
Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense. Within 
constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides whether federal courts 
can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what 
conditions, federal courts can hear them. 
Id. at 212-13. In response, Bowles argued that equitable exceptions should apply, since 
the district court misinformed him of the time for appeal. See id. at 213. However, the 
Court held that it "has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional 
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requirements," and that "because Bowles' error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he 
cannot rely on forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance." Id. at 213-14. 
By contrast, in Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that the requirement for timely filing a petition for certiorari 
was "jurisdictional and cannot be waived" because the requirement was based on one of 
its own rules. Id. at 64. The Court emphasized that "it must be remembered that this rule 
was not enacted by Congress." Id. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion pointed out that 
the Supreme Court has "without exception treated the statutory time limitations as 
jurisdictional." Id. at 65. The Court concluded: 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court has not presumed the right 
to extend time limits specified in statutes where there is no indication of a 
congressional purpose to authorize the Court to do so. Because we cannot 
waive congressional enactments, the statutory time limits are treated as 
jurisdictional. 
Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
It is no coincidence that "mandatory" statutes are considered jurisdictional and 
thus unwaivable. The Utah Constitution not only grants the Legislature constitutional 
lawmaking authority, as set forth above; it also affirms that its own provisions are 
"mandatory/' and thus cannot be derogated from unless expressly permitted: "The 
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words 
they are declared to be otherwise." UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 9, Sec. 26.5 
5
 Without elaborating the jurisdictional reasons therefor, this Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have held that a number of specific mandatory statutes cannot be waived. See 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan, 798 P.2d 738, 751 n.13 (Utah 
1990) (noting that the lis pendens and notice requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
11(3) "serve[ ] as a substantive restriction on the lien action" against a defendant without 
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E. Arbitration Pursuant to Section 78-31a-4(a) is Mandatory and 
Jurisdictional, and Thus Cannot Be Waived. 
Like the statutes in Parr v. Stubbs and Board of Education, discussed above, the 
arbitration compulsion provision of the Utah Arbitration Act (the "Act") is mandatory, 
and therefore jurisdictional, and cannot be waived. Section 78-3 la-4 of the Act provides: 
78-3 la-4 Court order to arbitrate. 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of 
an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an 
issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the 
scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine 
those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration 
agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court 
having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall 
be made to that court Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court 
with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action 
or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is 
made in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a 
stay of the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded 
on a claim that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault 
or grounds for the claim have not been shown. 
notice "and, unlike a true statute of limitation, is not waived if not pleaded."); State v. 
Fedder, 262 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1953) ("It is the majority view that a defendant cannot 
waive his presence at the time of sentence under a statute such as this by voluntarily 
absenting himself at the time set."); Victor Plastering, Inc. v. Swanson Bldg. Materials, 
Inc., 2008 UT App 474, f 14, 200 P.3d 657 (holding that "section 38-1-1 l(3)'s lis 
pendens and notice requirements . . . provide a non-waivable defense that cannot be 
construed as a statute of limitations"); Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927, 928 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-23(4) "cannot be 
waived, and the court is required to make the determination under the statute"). 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999)6 (emphasis added). 
The foregoing statute is clearly mandatory, requiring strict compliance with its 
terms. First, compelling arbitration under the terms of the statute is "of the essence o f 
the statutory scheme. Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 552. By its own terms, the statute 
governs any "court order to arbitrate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). In addition, 
the statute is not given with a view merely to the "proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of 
business." Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 552. Rather, its purpose is to ensure that persons 
showing an agreement to arbitrate are, in fact, granted a court order to arbitrate. It 
affords courts no discretion in granting such an order. Compelling arbitration is the 
precise function of this provision. 
Further, the plain language of the statute contains no ambiguity. Specifically, the 
term "shall" is used repeatedly throughout the provisions of the statute. As discussed 
above, "shall" is commonly understood to create a mandatory condition. See Aaron & 
Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, f^ 9. Presumably, this term was used advisedly. See 
Bd, ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1033. Furthermore, neither the statutory 
language nor its associated history provides any reason to deviate from this common 
understanding. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). The statute includes the term 
"may" in one circumstance under subsection four; however, the Legislature actually uses 
that term to reinforce the mandatory nature of the Act, declaring that arbitration "may not 
be" denied even if the trial court determines that the "issue subject to arbitration lacks 
merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have not been shown." Id. Accordingly, the 
6
 This version of the Act applies to the parties' SPA Agreement, which the parties 
executed effective November 15, 1999. 
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Legislature in no way vested the trial courts with discretion in determining the 
appropriateness of arbitration, assuming an enforceable arbitration agreement is found. 
In addition, substantial rights depend on compliance with the arbitration statute. 
The right to arbitration is plainly a substantial right, one for which this Court has 
repeatedly affirmed an "important policy interest." Cedar Surgery Center, 2004 UT 58, ^ 
14 (holding that this Court "has recognized the important public policy behind enforcing 
arbitration agreements as an 'approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling 
disputes and easing court congestion'" (quoting Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 
P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992))). Failure to obey the terms of the statute would plainly 
prejudice any party who contracted for arbitration - not litigation. See Buckner v. 
Kennard, 2004 UT 78, \ 18, 99 P.3d 842 ("Arbitration is 'a matter of contract.'" (quoting 
Cent Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, ^  10, 40 P.3d 599)); Pac. Dev., L.C v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, Tf 
13, 23 P.3d 1035 ("The scope of the arbitration is a governing standard that is 
fundamental to the expectations of the parties to the arbitration."). 
In addition, the trial court cannot "substantially comply" with a statute that 
compels a completely different system of dispute resolution - arbitration, instead of 
litigation. Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, \ 7. Accordingly, even a 
"directory" statute's standard of "substantial compliance" with the abovementioned 
statute would be inappropriate. 
Viewing the mandatory nature of this statute, this Court has thus correctly held: 
"Where the evidence relating to a purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the 
district court has no discretion under the statute. It must compel arbitration." 
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McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31 \ 10, 20 P.3d 901 (emphasis 
added) (citing Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Sys. Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1986) 
(construing contract to mandate arbitration of dispute)). 
Because the Act's arbitration statute is mandatory and jurisdictional, it cannot be 
waived. See, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210-12; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 68; Whitfield, 205 
U.S. at 489, 497-501. As the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Whitfield: "The legislative 
will, when expressed in the peremptory terms of this statute, is paramount and 
absolute, and cannot be varied or waived by the private conventions of the parties." 
Whitfield, 205 U.S. at 497 (emphasis added). To hold otherwise would permit the trial 
court to "exercise . . . powers properly belonging to" the "Legislative" department, in 
violation of Article V of the Utah Constitution. UTAH CONST, art. V, § 1. To hold 
otherwise would also violate Article VIII, Section 5's restriction on the trial court's 
jurisdiction as "limited by this constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5. In 
fact, the arbitration statute directly "limits the jurisdiction" of the trial court by rendering 
arbitration mandatory. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). 
In sum, this Court should construe the above arbitration statute as mandatory and 
jurisdictional, and therefore reverse the trial court's ruling denying arbitration. 
F. Arbitration is an Important Public Policy and Thus Cannot Be 
Waived. 
In addition, as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. Supreme Court, and other 
Circuit Courts have held, "waiver do[es] not in general apply to transactions that are 
forbidden by statute or are contrary to public policy." Am. Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold, 
375 F.2d 523, 528 (10th Cir. 1966) (quoting Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 
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307 F.2d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 1962); Jennings Water, Inc. v. North Vernon, 895 F.2d 311, 
317 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Gold, 375 F.2d 523); see also United Cities Gas Co. v. 
Brock Exploration Co., 995 F. Supp. 1284, (D. Kan. 1998) ("[T|he doctrines of waiver 
and estoppel generally do not apply to transactions that are forbidden by statute or are 
contrary to public policy."); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945) 
(holding that statutory entitlements guaranteed to employees by the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 were unwaivable because the structure and legislative history of the Act 
evinced a specific "legislative policy" of "preventing] private contracts" on such). 
There is no dispute that arbitration is an important public policy interest. See, e.g., 
Cedar Surgery Center, 2004 UT 58, TJ 14 (holding that this Court "has recognized the 
important public policy behind enforcing arbitration agreements as an 'approved, 
practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion'" 
(quoting Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358); Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, ^  24 ("In light of this 
policy, we have also acknowledged that there is "a strong presumption against waiver of 
the right to arbitrate.'"); see also Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, | 12, 114 P.3d 580. 
Accordingly, because arbitration presents an important public policy, Utah's 
courts cannot apply the doctrine of waiver to halt its use and benefits. 
G. This Court Should Abrogate Chandler and its Progeny. 
As set forth in Section I.C, supra, in Chandler, this Court "adopt[ed] the principle 
that waiver o f arbitration could occur "based on both a finding of participation in 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice." 
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Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360. This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have followed this 
principle in six subsequent cases. 
However, because the Act's arbitration requirement is mandatory and 
jurisdictional, it cannot be waived, nor can Utah courts derogate from its provisions. As 
this Court has previously held: 
Simply put, we must not craft a remedy where the legislature intends no 
remedy to exist. To do otherwise trespasses upon the legislative domain and 
threatens the fragile balance of power upon which our system of 
government rests. 
Gottling, 2002 UT 95 at \ 23. The Legislature has not permitted the equitable remedy of 
"waiver" to derogate from the mandatory arbitration requirement; in fact, it has mandated 
that such arbitration "shall be" ordered. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). 
Consequently, this Court should abrogate the rulings in Chandler and its progeny. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision 
denying Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration and remand this case to the trial 
court for further proceedings consistent with that determination. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Wolf Mountain hereby requests oral argument because it will materially assist this 
Court in resolving the issues in this case. 
7
 See Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, f 12, 114 P.3d 580; Cedar Surgery Center, 2004 UT 
58, H 14, 96 P.3d 911; Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, U 24, 40 P.3d 599; Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 19, 982 P.2d 572; Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Mgmt., 
Inc., 2005 UT App 381, \ 22, 122 P.3d 654; Am. Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Sys. Commc'n 
Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 192 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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DATED this 2nd day of November, 2009. 
David M. Wahlquist 
Rod N. Andreason 
RyanB. Frazier 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiffs 
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REQUEST! SUMIT COUNTY CLERK 
AMENDED AND RESTATED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
FOR THE CANYONS SPECIALLY PLANNED AREA 
SNYDERVILLE BASIN, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH 
TfflS AMENDED AND RESTATED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (the 
"Amended Agreement") is entered into as of this f§** day of Kto$e*0ter > 1999, by and 
among ASC Utah, Inc., d.b.a. The Canyons, American Skiing Company Resort Properties, 
Inc. (collectively the "Master Developer"), the group of landowners that are listed as 
Participating Owners and are signatories hereto (collectively the "Participating 
Landowners"), and Summit County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, by and 
through its Board of County Commissioners ("the County"). 
RECITALS 
A. Master Developer and Participating Landowners (collectively the 
"Developers") are the owners, legal representatives of the owners, or lessees under long-
term leases of approximately 7768 acres of land and appurtenant real property rights located 
in Summit County, Utah, the legal description and ownership maps of which are provided in 
Ordinance 333-A (the "Property"). 
B. On July 6, 1998, the County adopted and approved Ordinance 333, which 
established an initial Specially Planned Area ("SPA") Zone District for a portion of the 
Property. The initial SPA Plan for The Canyons SPA Zone District was implemented by 
Ordinance 334, a Development Agreement among the County and various of the Developers 
(the "Original Development Agreement"). 
C. The Original Development Agreement contemplated the need to amend the 
SPA Zone District and SPA Plan in the future to provide for its expansion and to create a 
master planned resort community as depicted in The Canyons SPA Plan Book of Exhibits 
attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
D. The County and the Developers desire to amend and restate the Original 
Development Agreement to provide for the vesting of certain additional land use 
designations, densities, development configurations, and development standards included in 
The Canyons SPA Master Development Plan, as reflected on Exhibit B hereto. 
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E. The County, through the adoption of this Amended and Restated Development 
Agreement (the "Amended Agreement"), desires to establish The Canyons Resort and Resort 
Community under the SPA provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development Code ("Code") 
and the Snyderville Basin General Plan ("General Plan") for the purpose of implementing 
development standards and processes that are consistent therewith. The Developers and the 
County desire to clarify certain standards and procedures that will be applied to certain 
additional approvals contemplated in connection with the development of The Resort and 
Resort Community, as well as the construction of improvements that will benefit the 
Property, and to establish certain standards for the phased development and construction of 
the Resort Community and certain improvements, and to address requirements for certain 
community facilities and amenities. The County also desires to receive certain public 
benefits and amenities, and the Developers are willing to provide these public benefits and 
amenities in consideration of the agreement of the County to provide increased densities and 
intensity of uses in the Resort and Resort Community pursuant to the terms of this Amended 
Agreement. 
F. This Amended Agreement amends and restates the Original Development 
Agreement and specifically implements The Canyons SPA Zone District as established by 
Ordinance 333-A in accordance with the General Plan and the Code. 
G. The County, acting pursuant to its authority under Utah Code Annotated Section 
17-27-101 et seq., the Code, and the General Plan, has made certain determinations with 
respect to The Canyons SPA Plan, and in the exercise of its legislative discretion has elected 
to approve the use, density, and general configuration of The Canyons SPA Plan resulting in 
the negotiation, preparation, consideration, and approval of this Amended Agreement after 
all necessary public hearings. 
FINDINGS 
1. Following lawfully advertised public hearings on May 18, May 24, and June 3, 
1999, the Resort and Resort Community received a recommendation for approval through an 
Amended Development Agreement by action of the Snyderville Basin Planning Commission 
taken on June 15, 1999. The Board of County Commissioners held a lawfully advertised 
public hearing on September 23, 1999, and during a lawfully advertised public meeting on 
November 8, 1999, approved The Resort and Resort Community under the process and 
procedures set forth in the Code and the General Plan. The terms and conditions of approval 
are incorporated fully into this Amended Agreement. In making such approval, the Board of 
County Commissioners made such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are required as 
a condition of the approvals, as reflected in the staff recommendation adopted with any 
modifications, as reflected in the minutes of the above-referenced public meetings, and as 
reflected by the other enumerated findings herein. 
2. The Canyons SPA Plan involves phased plat and site plan applications, and has 
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a cumulative proposed project size in excess of 100 acres. 
3. The Canyons SPA Plan, as reflected in and conditioned by the terms and 
conditions of this Amended Agreement, is in conformity with the General Plan, any existing 
capital improvements programs, the provisions of the Code, to include concurrency and 
infrastructure requirements, and all other development requirements of Summit County. 
4. The Canyons SPA Plan includes a number of amenities which are located on 
various Project Sites. The provision of these amenities, or the provision of land upon which 
to construct these amenities, has been taken into consideration by Summit County in granting 
increased residential and commercial densities on those Project Sites. This includes, among 
other things, the reservation of land for Golf, Trail, and Buffer areas. 
5. The Canyons SPA Plan contains outstanding features that advance the policies, 
goals, and objectives of the General Plan beyond mere conformity, including the following: 
(i) agreements with respect to design controls and limitations to minimize the visual impact 
of the development; (ii) the clustering and appropriate location of density; (iii) the creation of 
a significant trail system and park area connections and improvements; and (iv) the provision 
for specialized programs, facilities, and amenities to offset development impacts. 
6. There exists adequate provision for mitigation of all fiscal and service impacts 
on the general public. 
7. The Canyons SPA Plan meets or exceeds development quality and aesthetic 
objectives of the General Plan and the Code, is consistent with the goal of orderly growth in 
the Snyderville Basin, and minimizes construction impacts on public infrastructure within the 
Basin. 
8. There will be no construction management impacts that are unacceptable to the 
County. 
9. The Developers have committed to comply with all appropriate Concurrency 
and Infrastructure requirements of the Code, and all appropriate criteria and standards 
described in this Amended Agreement, including all applicable impact fees to the County and 
its Special Districts. 
10. The proposed development reasonably assures that life and property within the 
Snyderville Basin is protected from any adverse impact of this development. 
11. The Developers shall take appropriate measures to prevent harm to neighboring 
properties and lands from development, including nuisances. 
12. Throughout the period since the approval of the Original Development 
Agreement, during which time the Master Developer has been preparing to amend the 
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improvements required for the Project, including without limitation special assessments and 
special taxes under state law, and may include capital and non-capital financing or both. The 
County, at its sole discretion, may determine the conditions for the use of such financing, 
including, but not limited to, petitions or applications of the Master Developer and/or the 
RVMA, the making of deposits sufficient to cover any County out-of-pocket costs, the need 
for and the conditions of any current appraisals required for any financing and any standards 
relating to the marketing of any securities, such as lien-to-value ratios, taxable or tax-
exempts bonds and series, or other structural aspects of issues of securities. While the 
County agrees to cooperate in the consideration of such financing, including the taking of 
proceedings under appropriate authorities, the County does not guarantee that any securities 
can or will be issued, sold, or delivered except as may be approved by the County with the 
assistance and advice of the financial advisors, underwriters, consultants, and attorneys 
retained by the County for such purposes. 
Section 4.2 Cooperation between the County and the Developers. The County agrees to 
reasonably cooperate with the Master Developer and any Participating Landowner in their 
endeavors to obtain any other permits and approvals as may be required from other 
governmental or quasi-governmental agencies having jurisdiction over Project Sites or 
portions thereof. 
Section 4.3 Employee Affordable Housing. In the event that sites outside of The Canyons 
SPA, but within the jurisdiction of Summit County, are consistent with the General Plan and 
are identified by the County for employee housing in accordance with the Developers' 
obligations under this Amended Agreement and, if, after reasonable, good faith efforts by the 
Developers, the Developers do not receive all necessary permits and approvals for any such 
site so identified, the Developers shall not be relieved of the obligation to provide employee 
housing that such site was intended to fulfill under this Amended Agreement, but shall be 
allowed a reasonable delay in fulfilling such obligation under this Amended Agreement. 
ARTICLE 5 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 5.1 Default. 
5.1.1 Occurrence of Default. Default under this Amended Agreement occurs upon the 
happening of one or more of the following events or conditions: 
(a) A warranty or representation made or furnished to the County by a 
Developer, the RVMA, or The Colony Master Association in this Amended 
Agreement, including any attachments hereto, which is materially false or 
proves to have been false in any material respect when it was made. 
(b) A finding and determination made by the County following a Benchmark or 
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Annual Review that upon the basis of substantial evidence, the Master 
Developer, Developers, The Colony Master Association, or RVMA have not 
complied in good faith with one or more of the material terms or conditions of 
this Amended Agreement, including a failure to satisfy Benchmarks under 
Section 3.3. 
(c) Any other act or omission by the Developer(s) that materially interferes 
with the intent and objective of this Amended Agreement. 
5.1.2 Procedure Upon Default. Within ten (10) days after the occurrence of a default 
hereunder, the County shall give the Defaulting Party (where "Defaulting Party" means 
the party or parties alleged by the County under Section 5.1.1 as being in default) and 
the Canyons Resort Village Management Association and/or The Colony Master 
Association written notice specifying the nature of the alleged default and, when 
appropriate, the manner in which the default must be satisfactorily cured. The 
Defaulting Party shall have sixty (60) days after receipt of written notice to cure the 
default. Failure or delay in giving notice of default shall not constitute a waiver of any 
default, nor shall it change the time of default. Notwithstanding the sixty-day cure 
period provided above, in the event more than sixty days is reasonably required to cure 
a default and the Defaulting Party or some other party, within the sixty day cure 
period, commence actions reasonably designed to cure the default, then the cure period 
shall be extended for such additional period during which the Defaulting Party or such 
other party is prosecuting those actions diligently to completion. 
5.1.3 Remedies Upon Default. 
(a) Equitable Remedies: In the event a default remains uncured after proper 
notice and the expiration of the applicable cure period without cure, the County 
shall have the option of suing the Defaulting Party for specific performance or 
pursuing such other remedies against the Defaulting Parties as are available in 
equity. It is stipulated between the parties for purposes of any judicial 
proceeding that the County need only establish the occurrence of default under 
Section 5.1.1 of this Amended Agreement to obtain equitable relief. 
(b) Major Default: A "major default" means a default which, taking 
this Amended Agreement as a whole, has the effect of denying the County the 
essential benefits of this Amended Agreement or placing upon the County 
significant negative fiscal impacts not contemplated by this Amended 
Agreement. In the event of a major default, the County shall have the option of 
terminating this Amended Agreement in its entirety after proper notice and 
expiration of the applicable cure periods without cure, and after exhaustion of 
all equitable remedies, if applicable. 
Section 5.2 Enforcement. The parties to this Amended Agreement recognize that the 
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County has the right to enforce its rules, policies, regulations, and ordinances, subject to the 
terms of this Amended Agreement, and may, at its option, seek an injunction to compel such 
compliance. In the event that Developers or any user of the subject property violate the 
rules, policies, regulations or ordinances of the County or violate the terms of this Amended 
Agreement, the County may, without electing to seek an injunction and after sixty (60) days 
written notice to correct the violation (or such longer period as may be established in the 
discretion of the Board of County Commissioners or a court of competent jurisdiction if 
Developers have used their reasonable best efforts to cure such violation within such sixty 
(60) days and are continuing to use their reasonable best efforts to cure such violation), take 
such actions as shall be deemed appropriate under law until such conditions have been 
honored by the Developers. The County shall be free from any liability arising out of the 
exercise of its rights under this Section; provided, however, that any party may be liable to 
the other for the exercise of any rights in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-27-56, as each may be amended. 
Section 5.3 Reserved Legislative Powers. Future Changes of Laws and Plans. Compelling 
Countervailing Public Interest. Nothing in this Amended Agreement shall limit the future 
exercise of the police power of the County in enacting zoning, subdivision, development, 
growth management, platting, environmental, open space, transportation and other land use 
plans, policies, ordinances and regulations after the date of this Amended Agreement. 
Notwithstanding the retained power of the County to enact such legislation under the police 
power, such legislation shall only be applied to modify the vested rights described in this 
Amended Agreement based upon policies, facts and circumstances meeting the compelling, 
countervailing public interest exception to the vested rights doctrine in the State of Utah. 
(Western Land Equities. Inc. v. City of Logan. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980) or successor case 
and statutory law). Any such proposed change affecting the vested rights of the Developers 
and other rights under this Amended Agreement shall be of general application to all 
development activity in the Snyderville Basin; and unless the County declares an emergency, 
the Developers shall be entitled to prior written notice and an opportunity to be heard with 
respect to die proposed change and its applicability to The Canyons SPA Plan under the 
compelling, countervailing public policy exception to the vested rights doctrine. In the event 
that the County does not give prior written notice, Developers shall retain the right to be 
heard before an open meeting of the Board of County Commissioners in the event 
Developers allege that their rights under this Amended Agreement have been adversely 
affected. 
Section 5.4 Reversion to Regulations. Should the County terminate this Amended 
Agreement under the provisions hereof, Developers' Property will thereafter comply with 
and be governed by the applicable County Development Code and General Plan then in 
existence, as well as with all other provisions of Utah State Law. 
Section 5.5 Force Majeure. 
0 0 5 5 3 9 1 1 8*01297 PG00463 
59 
5.5 J Any default or inability to cure a default caused by strikes, lockouts, labor 
disputes, acts of God, inability to obtain labor or materials or reasonable substitutes 
therefor, enemy or hostile governmental action, civil commotion, fire or other 
casualty, and other similar causes beyond the reasonable control of the party obligated 
to perform, shall excuse the performance by such party for a period equal to the period 
during which any such event prevented, delayed or stopped any required performance 
or effort to cure a default. 
5.5.2 In the event the real estate sales figures published by the Park City Board of 
Realtors show a 20% or greater decline for real estate sales in the Park City area for 
the comparable six-month period in the preceding year or if the number of beds rented 
published by the Park City Chamber of Commerce/Convention and Visitors Bureau for 
the Park City area shows a 10% or greater decline in the number of beds rented for the 
comparable six-month period of the preceding year, then the RVMA and /or The 
Colony Master Association may notify the Community Development Director of such 
downturn in the economy and request a six-month extension of all the time limits set 
forth herein. Upon the verification of such published figures, but in no event later than 
twenty (20) days after such request, the Director shall grant a six-month extension on 
all relevant dates of performance as set forth herein. The Director shall thereafter 
immediately provide notice of such extension to the Planning Commission and BCC. 
In the event such downturn continues, the Director may grant additional six month 
extensions for the duration of the downturn. The RVMA may request and receive up 
to a maximum of twenty-four (24) months of such extensions during the first fifteen 
(15) years of the term of this Amended Agreement. 
Section 5.6 Continuing Obligations. Adoption of law or other governmental activity making 
performance by the Developers unprofitable, more difficult, or more expensive does not 
excuse the performance of the obligations by the Developers. 
Section 5.7 Other Remedies. All other remedies at law or in equity, which are consistent 
with the provisions of this Amended Agreement, are available to the parties to pursue in the 
event there is a breach. 
Section 5.8 Dispute Resolution. 
5.8,1 Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained herein 
shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended Agreement, then every such 
continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator 
agreed upon by the parties, or if no single arbitrator can be agreed upon, an arbitrator 
or arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall be resolved by the 
binding decision of the arbitrator, and judgment upon the award rendered by the 
arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. However, in no 
instance shall this arbitration provision prohibit the County from exercising 
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enforcement of its police powers where Developers are in direct violation of the Code. 
5.8.2 Institution of Legal Action. Enforcement of any such arbitration decision shall 
be instituted in the Third Judicial District Court of the County of Summit, State of 
Utah, or in the United States District Court for Utah. 
5.8.3 Rights of Third Parties. This Amended Agreement is not intended to affect or 
create any additional rights or obligations on the part of third parties. 
5.8.4 Third Party Legal Challenges. In those instances where, in this Amended 
Agreement, Developers have agreed to waive a position with respect to the 
applicability of current County policies and requirements, or where Developers have 
agreed to comply with current County policies and requirements, Developers further 
agree not to participate either directly or indirectly in any legal challenges to such 
County policies and requirements by third parties, including but not limited to 
appearing as a witness, amicus, making a financial contribution thereto, or otherwise 
assisting in the prosecution of the action. 
5.8.5 Enforced Delay. Extension of Times of Performance. In addition to specific 
provisions of this Amended Agreement, performance by the County, the Master 
Developer, or a Participating Landowner hereunder shall not be deemed to be in 
default where delays or defaults are due to war, insurrection, strikes, walkouts, riots, 
floods, earthquakes, fires, casualties, or acts of God. An extension of time for such 
cause shall be granted in writing by County for the period of the enforced delay or 
longer, as may be mutually agreed upon. 
5.8.6 Attorney's Fees. Should any party hereto employ an attorney for the purpose 
of enforcing this Amended Agreement, or any judgment based on this Amended 
Agreement, or for any reasons or in any legal proceeding whatsoever, including 
insolvency, bankruptcy, arbitration, declaratory relief or other litigation, including 
appeals or re-hearings, and whether or not an action has actually commenced, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party thereto reimbursement 
for all attorney's fees and all costs and expenses. Should any judgment or final order 
be issued in that proceeding, said reimbursement shall be specified therein. 
5.8.7 Venue. Venue for all legal proceedings related to this Amended Agreement 
shall be in the District Court for the County of Summit, in Coalville, Utah. 
5.8.8 Damages upon Termination. Except with respect to just compensation and 
attorneys' fees under this Amended Agreement, Developers shall not be entitled to any 
damages against the County upon the unlawful termination of this Amended 
Agreement. 
Section 5.9 Term of Agreement and Automatic Renewal. 
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1 SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH; APRIL 24, 2009 
2 JUDGE BRUCE LUBECK 
3 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Good morning. We'll call ASC vs. Wolf 
7 and others, 060500297 on calendar for argument on several 
8 motions. So let's have you state for the record who you are 
9 and who you represent and I think there's more than two of 
10 you. 
11 MS. FITLOW: Wolf Mountain, Victoria Fitlow for 
12 Wolf Mountain this morning. 
13 MR. WING: Robert Wing on behalf of Enoch Richard 
14 Smith. 
15 MR. ASHTON: John Ashton and Clark Taylor for ASCU. 
16 MR. BOREN: Your Honor, Jason Boren on behalf of 
17 third party defendants Joseph Croftcheck, English Inn, White 
18 Pine Development, Deer Pack Development, Orem Development, 
19 Paul Barker, William Snyder and David Lawson in his capacity 
20 as trustee of the Lawson Family Trust. 
21 MR. MORTENSEN: Good morning Your Honor, David 
22 Mortensen and Boren Sherman appearing on behalf of IHC Health 
23 Services Inc. 
24 MR. YEATES: Your Honor, if the Court please, my 
25 name is Ken Yeates. I'm here with Kyle Thompson on behalf of 
1 Development Agreement, these are the rules, this is what 
2 everybody can do with their property, we're all going to do 
3 some trades and we're going to put in some land and we're 
4 going to get a golf course because then what we have left is 
5 a lot of valuable because there's a golf course there. 
6 ASCU is seeking to hold Wolf Mountain liable in 
7 contract and in tort, there's an intentional interference 
8 tort claim here, for failing to convey the lands for the golf 
9 course. ASCU, they allege a parade of horribles in their 
10 damages section. They've alleged everything from lost 
11 revenue from the golf course to lost investment in the golf 
12 course, their out-of-pocket investment to date, lost profits 
13 from delayed or lost real estate development, lost skier 
14 days, damage to their financial and credit reputation, damage 
15 to their good will, their professional reputation. It's bad. 
16 Wolf Mountain didn't give up this land and that caused just 
17 this whole parade of horribles. Well, the ULRA gives Wolf 
18 Mountain the right to apportion fault for those damages to 
19 third parties. Even if they can't be made parties for 
20 whatever reason, Wolf Mountain is still going to be entitled 
21 to allocate fault and I think we've heard that here today. 
22 So we're still going to have to do all that discovery that's 
23 been laid out as a reason why they shouldn't be joined. 
24 That's still going to have to happen. Wolf Mountain still 
25 gets to allocate fault, even to non-parties if they can't be 
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1 joined for whatever reason, if they're immune pursuit or 
2 unknown tort feasors, whatever, if they're not parties, we 
3 still get to allocate fault because the benchmark, the 
4 touchstone of the ULRA is the statement that no party can be 
5 held liable for more than their proportionate share of fault. 
6 So even if those parties aren't in this claim, they're still 
7 going to have to deal with the issue of how much of it was 
8 their fault and how much of it was out fault and apportion 
9 damages and with the specific performance claims that are in 
10 here, isn't it better to have them in so that when we decide, 
11 Okay, well, this was your fault, that was your fault, this 
12 was their fault, now everybody put in and ASCU build the golf 
13 course. Let's get that all resolved in one big, nasty, 
14 blowup consolidated litigation which is what we already have 
15 and that's what we're trying to do. 
16 And I've already mentioned without the third party 
17 landowners in this case we run the risk of inconsistent 
18 rulings and I don't know how to resolve that absent having 
19 those parties in here. The only situation that makes sense 
20 is to have them all included in the litigation and subject to 
21 this Court's rulings. 
22 Now, one brief argument that GEC made in its 
23 pleadings was that these third party claims don't allege that 
24 a third party is liable to Wolf Mountain for all or part of 
25 the claims that are asserted against Wolf Mountain and I 
65 
1 think that's just wrong. Wolf Mountain, ASCU's claims 
2 against Wolf Mountain is that it must give up land for the 
3 golf course. There's a specific performance claim and a 
4 declaratory judgment claim. Then the third parties who are 
5 owners that are also subject to that same SPA Development 
6 Agreement, which is a contract they all entered into with 
7 Wolf Mountain, with ASCU, then they're liable to Wolf 
8 Mountain to turn over their land for the golf course. And 
9 that's exactly what Wolf Mountain has alleged in the third 
10 party complaint. 
11 Now this issue of the county being the sole 
12 enforcer and the arbitration provision of the SPA Development 
13 Agreement, I'd like to - I don't know if everyone has their 
14 copy of the SPA Development Agreement but (inaudible) 
15 attached as an exhibit to one of the motions. If the Court 
16 would like, I'd be happy to provide you with my copy but 
17 Article V, is the provision on default and that's what's 
18 cited by IHC and the Croftcheck parties with relation to this 
19 standing and arbitration argument. It's not true - the SPA 
20 Development Agreement doesn't make the county the sole 
21 enforcer of the SPA Development Agreement. I know the county 
22 had taken that position and that's a something that's being 
23 parroted here but it's just not the case and the SPA 
24 Development Agreement also does not have an exclusive 
25 arbitration provision. That's not true. Section 5 sets out 
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1 a default mechanism and default here is a defined term. So 
2 it's not just any generic breach. When there is a default, 
3 the county can declare a default mechanism. Basically what 
4 Section 5 does is it preserves the county's right to act as a 
5 municipality and to act as a governmental enforcing body and 
6 it sets out the county can declare a default, you have 60 
7 days to cure. If you don't cure, if that doesn't get ir 
8 resolved, then we go to arbitration. The arbitration 
9 provision specifically says, this is 5.1.3, "If a default" 
10 which is a defined term which has to be declared by the 
11 county, "if a default goes uncured then the county" I 
12 apologize, that's the wrong provision. Let me find the right 
13 provision. 
14 Here it is. "The arbitration provision, Section 
15 5.8.1 provides for binding arbitration but only in the event 
16 the default mechanism contained herein shall not sufficiently 
17 resolve the dispute under this amended agreement." It 
18 doesn't say, as Mr. Boren claimed, that all disputes arising 
19 under this agreement must be submitted to binding 
20 arbitration. It doesn't say that. All it says is that in 
21 the event that the default mechanism doesn't work and it 
22 doesn't get it resolved - the county declares a default, we 
23 have time to resolve it, it doesn't get resolved - then you 
24 go to arbitration. Well, there hasn't been any default 
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The above matter came before the court for decision on 
Wolf's motion to compel arbitration. 
2 
The motion was filed May 20, 2009. ASCU (or the ASC 
parties) filed an opposition response on June 12, 2009. Wolf 
filed a reply June 18, 2009, as well as a Request to Submit. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings and determined oral is 
not necessary. At the last hearing held June 5, 2009, and in a 
subsequent order, the court indicated it would rule based on the 
pleadings. The issues involved give the court are not 
dispositive. Oral argument would not benefit the court. The 
court will decide the issues based on the pleadings. 
ARGUMENTS 
Under the Utah Arbitration Act, UCA 78-31a-l, Wolf moves for 
an order to compel arbitration of all claims related to the Amended 
and Restated Development Agreement for the Canyons Specifically 
Planned Area ("SPA Agreement"), as is required by the Agreement's 
§5.8.1. Wolf claims that in its April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order, 
the court concluded that the SPA Agreement contains a mandatory 
arbitration provision, requiring any claim that the agreement was 
violated to be arbitrated. Accordingly, Wolf filed its Demand for 
Arbitration on May 18, 2009, seeking arbitration of the various 
parties' disputes under the SPA Agreement. Arbitration will 
likely resolve 80-90% of the disputes in this consolidated case, 
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and ensures that the various parties will receive consistent 
interpretation of their rights and avoid conflicting rulings and 
remedies regarding the issues under the agreement. Arbitration 
will also conserve judicial resources and expense to the parties. 
As facts Wolf claims that ASCU, ASC, and a group of 
participating landowners, including Wolf, entered into the SPA 
Agreement on November 15, 1999. On July 28, 2006, ASCU filed its 
First Amended Complaint alleging violations of the agreement and 
seeking remedies. ASCU alleges that (1) Wolf breached the 
contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
failing to convey required portions of land for the golf course 
development project and by failing to consent and execute necessary 
documents to facilitate development of the specially planned area; 
(2) Wolf intentionally interfered with ASCU's prospective economic 
relations under rights ASCU obtained under the agreement; (3) a 
dispute exists between the parties concerning their obligations 
under the SPA Agreement to develop a golf course; and (4) ASCU is 
entitled to a decree of specific performance requiring Wolf to 
convey the requested portions of land for the golf development 
project. On December 18, 2006, Wolf filed it Answer and 
Counterclaim also alleging violations of the SPA Agreement by ASCU 
and sought remedies. Wolf alleges that (1) ASCU breached the 
contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
failing to fulfill its development obligations; (2) ASCU committed 
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trespass to chattels and/or conversion by its acts relative to the 
agreement and golf course development; and (3) ASCU committed a 
prima facie tort by its acts relative to the agreement and golf 
course development. 
Wolf asserted substantially identical claims in its First 
Amended Complaint in Case No. 060500404, filed December 19, 2006. 
Wolf then filed a Motion to Amend and a Third-Party Complaint 
against the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership and the remaining 
participating landowners. Wolf's Motion to Amend was denied for 
various procedural reasons, but the court did conclude that the SPA 
Agreement §5.8.1 requires arbitration of Wolfs claims that the 
agreement was violated. As a result, Wolf filed a Demand for 
Arbitration against all parties to the SPA Agreement on May 18, 
2009. 
From these facts Wolf asserts that Utah law favors arbitration 
of disputes because it is a practical and inexpensive means of 
settling a dispute while easing court congestion. Chandler v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield, 833 P. 2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992). The court may 
determine "the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope 
of the matters covered by the agreement." UCA 78-31a-4(l). Also, 
"once the court finds that there is an enforceable agreement to 
arbitrate... the court shall order the parties to arbitrate." 
Here, the court has already determined in its April 29, 2009 
Ruling and Order that §5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement requires that 
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disputes claiming violation of the agreement require arbitration. 
Both parties are alleging breach of the SPA Agreement by the other, 
thus the present disputes are subject to mandatory arbitration. 
Furthermore, Wolf has already filed a Demand for Arbitration 
regarding both disputes in this case and the cases against third 
parties. Thus, the court should grant Wolf's Motion. However, 
if the court denies this Motion, arbitration will still proceed 
under the SPA Agreement against third parties not involved with 
this consolidated case. The arbitration will include some of the 
same issues and parties involved in this case, which could lead to 
inconsistent interpretations of the agreement and rulings. A 
single arbitration would correct this problem. Wolf estimates 
that 80-90% of the disputes found in these consolidated cases would 
be resolved by the arbitration, while conserving judicial resources 
and less expense to the parties. 
In opposition ASCU argues that Wolf is again attempting to 
derail this action. Three years have passed since ASCU filed its 
First Amended Complaint in July, 2006. During the three years, 
Wolf has participated in discovery and the court has heard and 
ruled upon several dispositive and other motions. Discovery 
closes in less than three weeks, yet Wolf filed a Motion to Compel 
Arbitration of all claims related to The Canyons SPA Agreement. 
None of ASCU's nor Wolf's causes of action allege a breach of 
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the SPA Agreement. All claims Wolf refers to in support of its 
Motion to Compel Arbitration are based upon conduct under, or 
breaches of, the July 3, 1997 Ground Lease. Ground Lease claims 
are not subject to the mandatory arbitration provision of the SPA 
Agreement just because the Ground Lease claims may relate to the 
golf course or some aspect of the SPA Agreement. 
In addition, Wolf has waived its right to compel arbitration 
of claims made in 2006. For three years Wolf has participated in 
this litigation without intent to arbitrate. This participation 
results in prejudice to ASCU if its claims are now sent to 
arbitration. 
ASCU claims as facts relevant to this motion that ASCU's 
July 2006 First Amended Complain does not allege various violations 
of the SPA Agreement, contrary to Wolf's assertion. ASCU's claims 
against Wolf stem from the Ground Lease, as the court recognized in 
its April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order. Wolf points to Paragraphs 
90 and 94 of ASCU's FAC to support its proposition that ASCU is 
seeking remedies under the SPA Agreement. However, Paragraph 90 
alleges "Wolf breached the Ground Lease by the conduct alleged 
above..." Paragraph 94 also asserts a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the Ground Lease. 
ASCU's FAC specifically alleges that Wolf breached its 
obligations under §25.03 and the Second Amendment of the Ground 
Lease by refusing to appear at an April 21, 2006, closing to convey 
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the necessary property to ASCU for the golf course. Paragraph 
99 of ASCU's FAC spells out Wolf's intentional interference with 
ASCU's economic relations. It states that in breaching the Ground 
Lease and acting in bad faith, uWolf intended to interfere, and 
did interfere with ASCU's existing and potential relation arising 
from the golf course project and The Canyons specially planned 
area." Under ASCU FAC 5108, ASCU seeks a declaratory judgment 
that it has performed all material conditions required under the 
Ground Lease, except conditions waived, excused or prevented by 
Wolf." ASCU also seeks a declaration that Wolf must convey the 
golf course land under §25.03 and the Second Amendment of the 
Ground Lease. Also under the same section of the Ground Lease, in 
Paragraph 119, ASCU seeks specific performance under the Ground 
Lease, requiring Wolf to convey the golf course land. 
Under Wolf's Counterclaims and First Amended Complaint, 
contrary to Wolf's assertion, of December, 2006, Wolf does not 
allege various violations of the SPA Agreement by ASCU or that Wolf 
is seeking remedies thereunder. Wolf has used a partial quote 
from its Counterclaims, % 68(3), in a misleading manner to make it 
seem that Wolf claims a Third Cause of Action, seeking damages 
under the SPA Agreement for a violation of the SPA Agreement. 
When reading the entirety of 1 68 of Wolf's Counterclaim, 
there is no question that Wolf is not seeking remedies under the 
SPA Agreement. Paragraph 68 states, "ASCU materially breached the 
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Ground Lease by the conduct alleged above, including.. . 3) various 
failures to fulfill its development obligations under the Ground 
Lease and SPA Agreement (which is further incorporated as an 
obligation under the Second Amendment [to the Ground Lease] 
including... a) Frostwood; b) Golf course." Furthermore, 1 71 of 
Wolf's Counterclaim concludes its Third Cause of Action by seeking 
to terminate the Ground Lease and recover damages upon ASCU's 
alleged breaches of the Ground Lease. Wolf's paraphrasing of 
its Sixth Cause of Action also selectively omits any reference to 
the Ground Lease. Wolf instead alleges a violation of the SPA 
Agreement, seeking remedies, because ASCU committed trespass to 
chattels and/or conversion by its acts relative to the SPA 
Agreement and golf Course. However, paragraph 81 actually 
alleges, UASCU intentionally interfered with Wolf Mountain's rights 
under the Osguthorpe Lease and/or otherwise dispossess Wolf of its 
rights under the Ground Lease by the following... 3) SPA Agreement; 
4) Frostwood; 5) Willow Draw; 6) golf course development." Thus, 
Wolf is seeking remedies based upon its rights under the Ground 
Lease. 
The entire history of this case and a review of the court 
docket indicates that Wolf has participated in discovery during the 
past three years, with discovery set to close at the end of June 
2009. The court has also heard and ruled upon several motions, 
many of which were filed by Wolf. The parties anticipate a trial 
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that will last about 30 days, with the court indicating it may be 
able to set trial in April, 2010. A scheduling conference will 
occurring July, 2009 to set a trial date. 
From these facts ASCU argues Wolf has used one sentence of 
dicta from this court's April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order to argue 
that this court intended for all golf course related claims in this 
litigation be compelled into arbitration. The April 29 Ruling 
thwarted Wolf's attempt to add eleven other landowners to this 
case, and this court saw the distinction between these new claims 
against third parties, seeking redress under the SPA Agreement, and 
ASCU's claims against Wolf. "The original claims against Wolf, 
involving the failure to give the land necessary for the golf 
course to ASCU, stem from the Ground Lease Agreement; a contract to 
which none of the third party defendants are a party." The 
arbitration provision in the SPA Agreement does not apply to the 
Ground Lease Claims in this case simply because they may relate to 
the golf course. The arbitration provision applies to disputes 
arising under the Amended SPA Agreement, in the event the default 
mechanism for resolving disputes fails. Through selective 
paraphrasing, Wolf hopes to convince this court into believing that 
both ASCU and Wolf seek remedies under the SPA Agreement for 
Violations of the SPA Agreement. Instead, both parties only seek 
remedies under the Ground Lease or for conduct that is a breach of 
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the Ground Lease. The arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement 
does not extend to all third-party contractual or tort claims that 
may relate to the SPA Agreement. Also, Wolf has asserted claims in 
this litigation against third parties who are not signatories to 
the SPA Agreement and are not subject to its provisions. These 
third parties include ASC, Leslie Otten and Blaise Carrig. Wolf 
recognized these parties are not subject to the SPA Agreement by 
not naming them as parties in its arbitration demand. 
Because ASCU's and Wolf's claims related to the golf course are 
causes of action for breach of the Ground Lease, they are not 
subject to the arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement. The 
court should deny the motion to compel arbitration solely on this 
basis. 
However, as an additional ground to deny this motion of Wolf, 
the ASC parties argue that Wolf has waived its right to 
arbitration. 
At this late stage, the ASC Parties would by prejudiced if the 
claims alleged in 2006 were compelled into arbitration as Wolf has 
substantially participated in this litigation. Although public 
policy favors arbitration, a party should not be allowed to suffer 
prejudice because of the opposing party's failure to timely assert 
a contractual right. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 
833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992) . A party can waive its right to 
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arbitration based upon "both a finding of participation in 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and 
a finding of prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
this two prong test on multiple occasions. See Cent. Florida Inv., 
Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc, 40 P.3d 599, 608 (Utah 2002) (utilizing 
Chandler test.); Cedar Surgery Ctr., L.L.C. v. Bonelli, 96 P.3d 
911, 914 (Utah 2004) ("the party alleging waiver must demonstrate 
(1) that the party seeking arbitration substantially participated 
in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the 
intent to arbitrate; and (2) that this participation resulted in 
prejudice to the opposing party.''); and Baker v. Stevens, 114 P.3d 
580 (Utah 2005) (seeking party waived its right to compel 
arbitration because it filed a summary judgment motion). The first 
prong of the Chandler test, whether the party seeking arbitration 
has substantially participated in litigation to a point 
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, requires a court to 
consider the action of the party seeking arbitration and "determine 
whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation." 
Cedar Surgery Ctr., L.L.C, 96 P.3d at 914. The types of 
participation in litigation that should be considered are by order 
of weight from least to most: participation in discovery and other 
aspects of litigation that do not necessarily involve the court; 
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requests made of the court by the parties; whether the parties' 
requests of the court demonstrate and intent to pursue litigation 
as compared to an intent to avoid litigation and a desire to be 
sent to arbitration. Cent. Florida Inv., Inc., 40 P.3d at 609. 
In Chandler, the Utah Supreme Court held that Blue Cross 
participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration 
when, prior to filing its Motion to Compel Arbitration, it filed an 
answer, a cross-claim, partook in discovery for five months, and 
reviewed discovery prior to its entrance in this case. "These 
actions clearly manifest and intent to proceed to trial." 
Here, the first prong of the Chandler test is easily 
satisfied. ASCU filed its First Amended Complaint in July, 2006. 
Instead of immediately moving to compel arbitration, Wolf filed a 
motion to dismiss, and after that was denied, filed its own 
separate suit, answer and counterclaim. Wolf also failed to raise 
the right to arbitration as an affirmative defense in its answer. 
Furthermore, Wolf has extensively litigated this case over the past 
three years. Wolf's actions demonstrate uan intent to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through 
litigation," rather than an intent to arbitrate. 
The second prong of the Chandler test, whether Wolf's 
participation in the litigation results in prejudice to the 
opposing parties if arbitration is ordered, may be shown in various 
ways. "Where the party seeking to compel arbitration engages in 
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discovery proceedings not available in arbitration, causes 
extensive or unreasonable expenses or delay by delaying the 
invocation of arbitration proceedings, or makes motions going to 
the merits of the adversary's claims," those actions may indicate 
prejudice to the opposing party. "Any real detriment is 
sufficient to support a finding of prejudice." Chandler, 833 P.2d 
at 360. In Chandler, the court relied on the discovery conducted 
and the expense incurred in the litigation. The ASC Parties have 
been prejudiced by Wolf's participation in this litigation and 
failure to request arbitration in a timely manner. Wolf has 
participated in a broad discovery and motion practice that would 
not have been available in arbitration. Any depositions useful in 
an arbitration proceeding would likely have to be redone with a 
different focus, since the eleven other landowners included in 
Wolf's demand for arbitration have not participated in discovery in 
this case. Arbitration of the SPA Agreement issues with third 
parties will not resolve Wolf's and ASCU's disputes under the 
Ground Lease. Moreover, Wolf has asserted claims in this 
litigation against third parties who are not signatories to the SPA 
Agreement, and not subject to its provisions. Recognizing this, 
Wolf did not name these third parties in its arbitration demand. 
Thus, no efficiencies or conservation of judicial resources are to 
be achieved by compelling arbitration at this late juncture. 
Instead, arbitration would be an inefficient duplication of effort 
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causing further delay. Wolf uses the Court's April 29, 2009 
Ruling and Order as a basis for its eleventh hour demand for 
arbitration. It is simply too late. In the Utah Supreme Court's 
seminal decision on this issue it states, "the policies favoring 
arbitration are largely defeated when the right of arbitration is 
not raised until an opposing party has undertaken much of the 
expense necessary to prepare a case for trial." Chandlery, 833 P.2d 
at 361. Wolf's late arbitration demand is not justified by the 
Court's April 29 Ruling because Wolf has been aware of both 
parties' pertinent claims since 2006, and was aware of the 
existence of the arbitration provision in the SPA Agreement. Wolf 
has chosen to litigate these claims in this Court, and that parties 
have spent three years undertaking much of the expense necessary to 
complete discovery and prepare for trial. 
In reply Wolf points out that ASCU does not dispute (1) this 
court's statement that the SPA agreement requires arbitration of 
disputes thereunder; (2) the validity of the arbitration clause in 
the SPA Agreement; (3) public policy in favor of arbitration; (4) 
the mandatory language of the Utah Arbitration Act - that parties 
"shall" arbitrate disputes subject to a valid arbitration* 
agreement; or (5) the likelihood of inconsistent rulings and 
remedies for both parties to this case and third parties if the 
same issues are resolved in different forums." ASCU instead claims 
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that Wolf has waived arbitration and made a blatant attempt to 
mislead this court by identifying the portions of the parties' 
pleadings that allege violations under the SPA Agreement. 
Wolfs Motion is aimed at following the direction of this court in 
that the SPA Agreement "requires arbitration'' and "any claim by 
Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated... is subject to the 
mandatory arbitration provision." Accordingly, Wolf seeks 
arbitration of the SPA Agreement dispute of all persons involved in 
those dispute, including the parties in this case. 
Contrary to ASCU's depiction, this case involves disputes 
under both the Ground Lease and SPA Agreement. The parties have 
been litigating this case for a long time, but the court no longer 
has jurisdiction where claims arise under a valid arbitration 
agreement. This court's April 29 Ruling reversed Wolf's position 
that it had the right to arbitrate disputes under the SPA 
Agreement, resulting in this motion. This court should not hold 
that Wolf has waived arbitration due to the "strong presumption 
against finding that a party waived its right to arbitration." 
Wolf is already arbitrating these issues with the parties to 
the SPA Agreement that are not parties in this case, as per the 
court's Order. The SPA Agreement disputes must be resolved one way 
or another - either partially in this court and partially in 
arbitration, or together in the forum and manner that the parties 
to the SPA Agreement specifically agreed to. If done partially in 
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this court and partially in arbitration, adjudications, remedies 
and results may conflict and be interpreted and enforced 
differently. It would be better to handle it all in arbitration. 
Thus, given what the ASC parties do NOT contest, aside from 
its waiver argument, ASCU concedes that there is no basis under 
Utah statutes, case law, concerns of fairness to third parties, or 
this court's own rulings for this court to deny arbitration of any 
disputes under the SPA Agreement. 
ASCU posits that the disputes in this case do not fall under 
the arbitration clause of the SPA Agreement. ASCU fails to 
address the language of the arbitration clause, even though this 
language is a court's primary focus in determining whether 
arbitration is needed on certain claims. See Cummings v. FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 404 F.3d 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005) 
("where the arbitration clause is broad, there arises a presumption 
of arbitrability and arbitration of even a collateral matter will 
be ordered if the claim alleged implicates issues of contract 
construction or the parties' rights and obligations under it."); 
In determining arbitrability, a court is to look upon the 
relationship of the claim to the subject matter of the arbitration 
clause. Here, the arbitration clause provides that if a dispute 
arises under the Amended SPA Agreement, then every dispute, 
difference and disagreement shall be referred to arbitration. 
Thus, this court must assess whether any of the claims in this case 
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constitute a "dispute, difference [or] disagreement under" the SPA 
Agreement - in substance, not in how they are pleaded or 
characterized. In ASCU's FAC, ASCU asserts that Wolf is liable for 
breach of contract by "failing to convey the required portions of 
its land for the golf course development project." This topic 
does not fall under the Ground Lease, except where the Ground Lease 
refers to or incorporates the SPA Agreement. ASCU only shows that 
it pleaded a breach of the Ground Lease, but fails to show that 
this dispute truly arises under the Ground Lease, which was 
executed years before the golf course development project arose. 
The golf course development project is actually a requirement of 
the SPA Agreement. The failure of the golf course development 
project is a "dispute, difference, [or] disagreement under" the SPA 
Agreement. Also in its FAC, ASCU claims Wolf is liable for breach 
of contract by "failing to consent to and execute necessary 
documents to facilitate the development of the specially planned 
area." The Ground Lease does not describe any "specially planned 
area," yet this is what the acronym SPA stands for and is the 
subject of the SPA Agreement. How ASCU characterized this dispute 
is immaterial. Additionally, the ASCU FAC claims that Wolf 
intentionally interfered with ASCU's prospective economic relations 
under rights ASCU obtained under the Ground lease and the SPA 
Agreement. This claim discusses the golf course development 
project, the golf course transaction, and other development 
18 
projects discussed 11 1 -dep11 1 :i i 1 11: 1 e SPA Agreemen 1: T1 ie ASCU FAC 
also alleges "A dispute exists between the parties regarding their 
respective obligations under the Ground I .ease and t.he SPA Agreement 
for the development of a golf course , ::.,<*; i: • 11 ie 
substance of this clai m i s whether Wolf is required to convey the 
portions of land for the golf course development project under the 
SPA Agreement. ASCU seeks specific performance of Wo]f conveying 
this land, which its squarely within the SPA Agreement. 
Furthermore, W o l f s counterclaims assert breaches/disputes under 
both the Ground Lease and the SPA Agreement, Regardless of how 
characterized, several disputes at issue in this care are 
" di sputes,, d:i f f e rence s • : n : di sa gr eement s t :ii ide i 11 i• B S PA Agr eemei It. 
As noted, contracts are to be interpreted "in favor of arbitration, 
in keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution 
o f d :i s p i 11 e s w h e i i t h e p a r t i e s h a v e i I o t a g r e e d t :> J i t :i g a t i :> i I ."'" R e e d 
v. Davis County Scb. D ist., 892 P. 2d 1063, 1065 (Utah App. 1995). 
Wolf claims i t has not waived arbitration. The Utah 
L e g i s 1 a t u r e I I a s i i o t p e r i a i 11 e d w a i v e r o £ a r b i t r a t i o i i 1 11 i :i a r 11 I e 
Utah Arbitration Act, the court may determine "the existence of an 
arbitration agreement or the scope of matters covered by tlle 
agreem* >i il I J 21 ; 8 3 1 , :i 4 ( ] 9 9 9 ) : i :i ;<• ; 1 . 1 i , 2 < :< n 1:1 1 : f:i 1 i< k ; « 1 1 1 
enforceable agreement to arbitrate, the court "shall order the 
parties to arbitrate." "Where the evidence relating to a 
purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district 
19 
court... must compel arbitration.'7 McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Utah, 20 P.3d 901, 904 (Utah 2001). The requirement that the 
court order arbitration is "mandatory, and ... jurisdictional." 
Cache County v. Property Tax Div., 922 P. 2d 758, 764 (Utah 1996). 
Thus, this court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with SPA 
Agreement claims that are subject to the valid arbitration clause. 
Additionally, Wolf has not previously demanded arbitration 
because it had believed and maintained the position that it did not 
have a right to seek arbitration of disputes under the SPA 
Agreement without Summit Country first declaring a default per the 
terms of that provision. Under Utah law, a waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. American Sav. and 
Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1968). This court's 
April 29, 2009 Ruling is what made Wolf aware that "any claim by 
Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated in some way is subject to 
the mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." So, in 
adherence with this ruling, Wolf sought to arbitrate these claims, 
filing a Demand for Arbitration and this Motion to Compel 
Arbitration 16 days later. This does not constitute a knowing and 
intentional waiver of arbitration by Wolf. Notably, "there is a 
strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate." 
Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 40 P.3d 599, 608 (Utah 
2002). Consequently, waiving a right to* arbitrate must be 
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intent i o i i. a .1 , a i 1 d i 11a ^  <: i: 1,3 ;«y b e i n f e r i: e d w 1 i e r e 11 I e p a r t: y s e e k i i i g 
arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate. Baker v. 
Steven-,, •; P. 3d 580, 583 (Utah 2005). Since Wolf's position that 
it c.i,i not have a right to arbitrate was recently reversed by this 
court - IF. April 29 Ruling, coupled with the Utah courts' strong 
p r e s urn | * • : ; f j i i d :i i I g « • "" ' '' w a :i v e d :i 1: s r i g 1 I t t o 
arbitration, this court should not hold that Wolf has waived its 
right to arbitration. 
E ' - < c o I i ] d a i i :i :i :ii :i w a :i ^  r e a r 1: • :i 11: a t :i <: > i I , a r b :i 11: a t :i o i I 
remains the most logical and beneficial solution for the parties to 
the SPA Agreement, including the parties to this case. In v -
i i :i. :i t :i a 1 me mo r a . > w e d 1:1 i a t a r b i t r a; - < * i d 
under the SPA Agreement against persons thai ir- W-JZ parties to 
this consolidated case even if this Motion, is denied. The 
a rb i t r a t i o i i :i i I c 11 i d e s s orrte o f 11 i e s ame i s s u e s t I i: ide i: 11 I e S PA 
Agreement among the same persons who are parties in this case. 
Proceeding simultaneously in this action and - h h the arbitration 
regarding tl le same disputes could subject .". . - he parties to 
inconsistent interpretations, rulings and remedies under the 
agreement Inconsistency could make it difficult for any party to 
comply with both this court's rulings and the arbitrator's 
decisions, plus make i* r.oie di.rflcult for ail parties to 
i n d < •['•'-• •- i * ' >*",! --b 
a r b i t r a t i o n •*• : ••niformly resolve abou1 ^0- -JWS -OL uie d i sputes 
under the SPA Agreement and presently found in these consolidated 
cases. ASCU has left most of these arguments undisputed. 
Arbitration provides the best and most uniform determination for 
Wolf, ASCU, and numerous other third parties. 
DISCUSSION 
In its April 29, 2009 Ruling, this Court acknowledged that 
disputes, differences or disagreements arising under the SPA 
Agreement are subject to arbitration, pursuant to §5.8.1 of the SPA 
Agreement. As a result, Wolf then filed this Motion to Compel 
Arbitration. The court is aware that Wolf now has new lead counsel 
and changes in approach to the case are understandable. 
Wolf claims that 80-90% of the disputes in this case will be 
resolved by arbitration while avoiding conflicting interpretation 
of, and remedies under, the SPA Agreement if required to litigate 
this case in addition to arbitration with others that are not 
parties in this case. The court is required to resolve two issues: 
(1) whether the arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement applies 
to the issues in dispute in this case; and (2) whether Wolf has 
waived its right to arbitration. 
I. Does the arbitration provision of the spa agreement apply to 
the issues in dispute in this case? 
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I Ii ider U C A 7 8B 1 1 J 0 i (3) 1 .1 I. i i ; < :< >i I. i I ; ;1 i< LI ] deed de whethi ir a 
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.'' "The court 
shall... order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds there is no 
enforceable agreement to arbitrate.'' UCA 7 8B 11 1 08 (1 ) (1 ) . 
Furthermore, where the "arbitration clause is broad, there arises a 
presumpti on of arbitrability and .-"bi^rn* : -<r M : «ven a collateral 
matter will be ordered if the claii. s i e g e d implicates issues of... 
the parties' rights a:.-J obligations under it [the contract]." 
Cuinni i i igs \ B '" sdEx Grc > * *! i ' *•. ' ' [ i d t h 
Cir. 2005). In Cummings, a provision that "refers to ail disputes 
arising out of a contract to arbitration," is broad. 404 F.3d -' 
1262. Tl ie S.Pi i Kqre*^ :- :^*ei -t 
if the default mechanism fails to sufficiently resolve a dispute, 
"then every such continuing dispute, difference and disagreement 
shall" be referred to an arbitrator. Thus, t:llis is a broad 
provision which lends to a presumption of arbitrability to matters 
ever I coJ 1 atera] to the SPA Agreement, The ASC parties posit that 
the arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement simp.iy does not 
apply to this case because all causes of action and remedies are 
brought i II ider tl ie Groi m d Lease alone. The court recognizes that 
"the original claims against Wo] f, involving the failure to give 
•the land necessary for '< tv qolf course t-, ASCII, stem from the 
hioiind Ijuust- Agreement , 
]6,,i lloweven, many claims in this case relate to the golf course 
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development project or the specially planned area, which are 
requirements and subjects of the SPA Agreement, not the Ground 
Lease. At a minimum, the claims at issue in this case are 
collateral to the SPA Agreement by implicating the parties' rights 
and obligations under the SPA Agreement. Thus, the issues in 
dispute in this case may very well be arbitrable under the broad 
arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement because of the 
agreement's relation to the parties' claims regarding the golf 
course development project and specially planned area. 
II. Has Wolf waived its right to arbitration? 
"Extrajudicial resolution7' of disputes is to be encouraged 
"when the parties have not agreed to litigation." Reed v. Davis 
County Sch. Dist. , 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). There 
is "a strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate." 
Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, 1112-13 (Utah 2005). Waiver of a 
right to arbitrate must be intentional, but may be inferred "if the 
facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration 
intended to disregard its right to arbitrate." Cent. Fla. Invs., 
Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, 124 (Utah 2002). This is 
determined by examining (a) "whether the party [seeking 
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inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate;" and if so, (b) "whether 
that participation resulted in prejudice to the oooosinq party.. 
Chandler v. B lue Cross Blue Siu>~±a, bJj i . ..:a \t, ..or {o.aa /.. }) . 
A. Has Wolf Substantially p a rticipated in Litigation to a 
Point Inconsistent wi th the Intent to Arbitrate? 
A p a r t "v s i i b s t a i I t 1 a ] 3 y p a r t i c j p a t e s :i i i ] :i t i g a t :i o i I t c a j: : • :ii i I t 
inconsistent with ah i..; • ,a to arbitrate when the party's actions 
demonstrate "M: intent to submit : the uirisdiction u: the court 
c • •.' - \( - r e ire.*- ' - v ,\.: <c. , 
2002 U'J 3, 126. Parties actions to be considered in order of 
weight from lowest to highest are, vxa party's intent or attitude 
t ow a r d :i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o it I :i i I .1 11 i g a. t i oi I • r e q\ i e s t s nia d e o f 11 I e 
•court by the parties/' and "whether the parties 1 requests of the 
court demonstrate an intent to pursue litigation or whether they 
demonstrate ai I i * > i <:=i\ i 1: 1:o avoi d 1 itigati oi i ai id a desIre to be sei 11 
to arbitrate.'7" Chandler, filing an answer and cross-claim and 
participating **% -5nd reviewing discovery for five months prior to 
filing a ?ka : Compel Arbitration was inconsistent with an 
intent to arbitrate. Additionally , i n Smile Inc. Asia v. 
B r i t e Sm i 1 e , 2 G 0 5 U T App 3 81, 11 i e c o i i r t I I e 3 d 1.1: I a t f j ] :i i I q a i I d a r q i i .i i I q 
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motions to dismiss with supporting memoranda, filing a 
counterclaim, filing memoranda in opposition to its opponents 
motions, filing joint scheduling orders, filing a motion for a 
protective order of certain discovery, serving several requests for 
discovery, taking and defending depositions of multiple witnesses, 
and engaging in correspondence with opposing counsel regarding 
discovery issues were are all actions inconsistent with an intent 
to arbitrate. However, in Central Florida Investments, the court 
held that the party seeking to compel arbitration did not waive its 
right to arbitration when it engaged in litigation because it did 
so unwillingly, without any intent to disregard this right. 2002 
UT 2, 531. This was evidenced by the fact that the party seeking 
to compel arbitration expressed and communicated its desire to 
arbitrate by letter to opposing counsel three days after it 
received notice of the complaint, in its motion to dismiss and 
supporting memoranda, and presented the existence of the 
arbitration agreement as a reason to find in its favor in its 
counterclaim. Id. at 130. 
Wolf posits that a waiver of arbitration must be intentional, 
and that it did not intentionally waive arbitration because it was 
not aware of its right to arbitration under the SPA Agreement until 
this Court's April 29, 2009 Ruling, which immediately resulted in 
Wolf asserting its right. Regardless of Wolf's awareness, a waiver 
of the right to arbitration may be inferred by a parties' actions 
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which demonstrate substai 11 i a] part:i c ipati en 1 :i i i J :i t:i g a t :i or 1 1:o a 
point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. The ASC Parties 
contend that instead of immediately moving to compel arbitration, 
Wolf filed a motion to dismiss, and after that was derlied, fi led 
its own separate suit, answer and counterclaim. Wolf also failed 
to rai se the i:i g 1 1 t: tc • arb:i 1:ration as an affirmative defense. Wolf 
has extensively litigated this case over the past three years. A 
brief review of the docket for these consolidated cases shows that 
Wo 1 f has taken a<,t uais i i Iconsistei It w:i 1:\ I a r i, :i i Itei I t to arb:i trate by 
conducting discovery for about three years, taking and defending 
numerous depositions, and extensive motion practice, similar t 
wi lat occi irred :i i i Smi Ie I I ::ic. A := ! • 
consumes 37 volumes, growing daily. i'ni IK- wnat. occurred m 
Central Florida Investments, Wolf has failed to ensure that the 
court and parties involved were aware of i ts i i itei it to seek 
arbitration. Therefore, Wolf's actions during the past three 
years recr.u-.;.. f these consolidated cases have demonstrated its 
willingness tie engage in 1itigation to a point inconsistent with an 
intent to arbitrate. 
Ifiust be determined whether the ASC Parties 
woui.i be prejudiced by arbitration. 
B. Has ASCU shown there is prejudice if arbitration is 
ordered? 
"Prejudice [to the opposing party] must result from a [seeking 
party's] delay in the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not from 
factors that are inherent in arbitration itself." Chandler, 833 
P.2d at 359. "Prejudice can occur if a party gains an advantage in 
arbitration through participation in pretrial procedures." It 
also occurs "where the party seeking arbitration allows the 
opposing party to undergo the types of expenses that arbitration is 
designed to alleviate, such as the expense of preparing to argue... 
pretrial motions or... of conducting discovery procedures that are 
not available in arbitration." The ASC Parties point to Wolf's 
participation in a broad discovery and motion practice that would 
not have been available in arbitration as evidence that the ASC 
Parties have been prejudiced by Wolf's failure to request 
arbitration in a timely manner. Additionally, the parties have 
spent three years undertaking must of the expense necessary to 
complete discovery and prepare for trial. There has been an 
enormous push with countless depositions, local and in several 
states, occurring during the months of May and June, to end within 
days of this ruling. The ASC Parties argue, especially when 
considering that Wolf has asserted claims in this litigation 
against third parties that are not signatories to the SPA Agreement 
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is too late to consider efficiency and conservation of resources. 
Thus, '.*• policies favoring arbitration are defeated and the ASC 
Par tit •.;.••• • • • • • - • n e c a u s e Wc: •] f f eeJ s ti lat :i 1: clli d i: i : t 
intend ro, i; --;-is thus incapable of waiving its rights to 
arbitration under- *-h^ '"••" Agreement, it did not to refute the ASC 
Parties' claims that .^s been prejudiced 1: y Wo.1 f's dej ay :i • 1 
asserting its right to arbitration. Hence, when looking at the 
extent of discovery and motion practice that has occurred over the 
past three years and the expense of this litigation to the parties 
at this point, the court finds and concludes that the ASC Parties 
have b e e n p r e j \ 1 d J c e d t • ;y W o J f' s J a t e a s s e r t i o 1 1 ::) f ; r :i g 1 11 1: o 
arbitrate under the SPA Agreement. 
CONCI .1 JSION 
In short, although Wolf may have a right to arbitration of 
issues i n dispute in this case under the SPA Agreement, its actions 
o v e 1: 11 1 e p a s t 11 1 r e e ye a 1: s 1 1 a v e f a :i 1: e d t: c c oirti 1: 1.1 1.1 1 :i c a t e a 1 :i it 1 11: e 1 1 1 I: ::» 
arbitrate while heavily participating in many facets of J itigation. 
Allowing Wolf to assert its rights to arbitration this late in the 
11 .> 1 d p 1: e j 1:1 d i c e 11 1 e A S C I ' a 1 t: :i e s b e c a 1 1 s e 11 1 e > 1: 1 a v e s p e r 11 1:1 1 r e e 
years engaging in high] y contested litigation, with the appointment 
of a special master needed because of a failure to be able to 
resolve discovery disputes between the parties. Furthermore, 
arbitration would not resolve all disputes in this case because 
this case involves third parties that are not signatories of the 
SPA Agreement. The core claims in this case, by each party, 
revolve around the Ground Lease and issues surrounding the golf 
course, important though they may be, are somewhat collateral to 
those main issues of other alleged breaches. The reasons Utah 
courts favoring arbitration, expedience and conservation of 
resources, would be largely defeated by conducting arbitration this 
late. Wolf has waived its right to arbitration by its actions up 
to this juncture, and it Motion to Compel Arbitration should be 
denied. 
The motion to compel arbitration is DENIED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
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